United States Deterrance Policy in the 1960's: Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publicly Speak Out by Harswick, Martin Andre
UNITED STATES DETERRENCE POLICY IN THE 1960'sJ 
MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
PUBLICLY SPEAK OUT 
An abstract of a Thesis by 
Martin Andre Harswick 
December 1972 
Drake University 
lhg Eroblem. What was the pUblic image conveyed by
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's con­
cerning the deterrent policy of the United States, and to 
what extent did the Vietnam conflict mirror that impression? 
Procedure. The pUblic speeches, interviews and con­
gressional testimony of Joint Chiefs of Staff members from 
1960 through 1969 were examined for their outlook on deter­
rence. During the research for this information three sources 
provided the bulk of the documented material used. They were 
the Congressional Record, Vital SEeeches of ~ Day and U.S. 
News & World Repor]. 
Findings. In the 1960's the deterrent power of the 
United States relied mainly on the retaining of a strategic
nuclear force capable of surviving a nuclear attack with 
enough counter force to destroy the aggressor. 
During that decade members of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff also stressed that conventional non-nuclear war was 
more likely to come about than general nuclear war. It was 
therefore necessary for the United States to prepare to 
fight such conventional conflicts. Without a conventional 
flexible response policy the United States would have only 
two responses in the face of non-nuclear Communist aggres­
sion, withdrawal of opposition or retaliation with nuclear 
weapons. Conventional strength would provide for graduated 
responses to all levels of hostile Communist actions. 
Acceptance of this limited war concept was clearly
demonstrated in Vietnam not only in the non-use of nuclear 
weapons but also in the limitations placed on the American 
military. 
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Chapter 1 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
 
ITS ROLE AND PERSONNEL
 
As the top officers of the American military estab­
lishment the public statements by members of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's had at least two major 
purposes. One was the desire to gain public support for 
the viewpoints expressed. The second was to instruct 
~merican society in the rudiments of the United States 
military policy. In attempting to achieve those goals, 
the Chiefs of Staff were highly visable proponents of 
select causes. 
The domestic turmoil in the United States brought 
about because of American involvement in Vietnam, over­
shadowed the far more important prevention of nuclear war 
between the super powers in the 1960's. Such turmoil and 
the absence of a nuclear conflict were due in part to the 
deterrence polley advocated by the Joint Chiefs. In exam­
ining their public statements of that period a clearer 
perspective of United States nuclear and non-nuclear 
deterrent policy is gained. 
Although informally created by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in 1942 to direct the strategic planning of World 
War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not gain legal status 
2
 
until the National Defense Act of 1947. Under this act the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff was recognized as the principal 
military advisory body to the President, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the National Security Council. 1 
Despite its position as the central planning and 
advisory agency of defense matters the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
has no plenary decision making authority.2 The Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958, an amendment to the National 
Defense Act of 1947, kept the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an 
advisory role and left final decision making on military 
matters in the hands of the President.) 
Besides its advisory role the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
under the authority and direction of the President and 
Secretary of Defense, has among other duties, the responsi­
bility for providing the strategic direction and operation 
of the Armed Forces. 4 
Membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consists of 
a military Chairman: the Chief of Naval Operations: the 
Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Staff, 
1U•S ., Congressional Record AQpendix, 87th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1962), CVIII, 7167. 
2 U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1961), eVIl, No.6, 7296. 
3U•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, CVIII, 7167. 
4United states Government Organization Manual
 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 126.
 
3
 
United States Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps.l 
Military officers because of their authority in 
certain fields and their access to special information are 
sought after as speakers and writers. 2 In response to 
pUblic demand the Chiefs of Staff as the senior military 
officers in the American military establishment made numerous 
public appearances. They also served as a vital source of 
military information for committees of Congress. 
The speeches, interviews and congressional testimony 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were well covered and docu­
mented. Their views most often appear in the Congressional 
Record, where speeches and testimony in whole or part are 
recorded, Vital Speeches of the Day, which includes entire 
speeches and [.~. News ~ World Report, which often publishes 
interviews of Joint Chiefs. 
The vast implications that military policy had on 
American society, the need to associate singular military 
aspects of their statements with more mundane background 
information, the desire to gain public support for their 
policies or those of their superiors and the general 
overall informative and educational nature of their position 
lUnited States Government Organizatiop Manual 
(Washingtonl Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 126. 
2h1f the Military is Compelled to Speak," Newsweek 
LIX (January, 1962), 27. 
4
 
caused the Joint Chiefs to speak out on a broad range of 
subject matter. These included national defense, religion, 
the American Revolution, civilian control of the military, 
the use of the Armed Forces to control riots, economic 
competition with Communism, patriotism and nuclear deterrent 
and flexible response policy. 
As their speeches, testimony, and interviews were 
intended for public consumption their statements were pre­
sented for the most part in layman's language. There was 
also a very strong tendency to present their views in 
periodicals in broad generalities. 
The content of public statements by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff was limited by national security requirements and 
by bureaucratic considerations. In 1962 alone, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff speeches were eliminated completely, deleted in 
part or otherwise changed in meaning because the original 
content caused "increasingly unfavorable publicity," brought 
about "mounting adverse criticisms" or did not correspond 
with the spirit of the executive office. Changes were also 
made to bring about clarity, to avoid misrepresentations, to 
eliminate derogatory remarks about university personnel, to 
play down the cold war, to "prevent premature announcements", 
and to "eliminate over emphasis on sensitive issues".l 
I V•S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1962), eVIIl, No. 2, 2~46-2491. 
5 
During the Eisenhower administration the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff were in the position of either presenting a 
unanimous front to the public or keeping divergent views to 
themselves. 1 The trend of having the speeches of leading 
military officers censored was continued by President John F. 
Kennedy who required advance review of Pentagon speeches to 
insure clarity, strength, and consistency in such public 
speeches. 2 
The concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with 
administration policy is actively sought. At times crude 
or subtle pressure has been applied to get individual member 
agreement to views of higher authority. The intensity of 
pressure indicates the importance of Joint Chiefs of Staff 
approval. 3 In short, members are at times pressured to 
conform to presidential wishes and are warned not to oppose 
them. 4 Such a policy was no doubt followed during the 
1Samuel P. Huntington, ~ Soldier and the Statel 
The TheorY and PQlitics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge I 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 
394-395· 
2"Muzzles and Licenses," Newsweek, LIX (February, 
1962), 22, see also John M. Swomley Jr., The Military Estab­
lishment (Boston. Beacon Press, 1964), 11); U.S. Congressional 
Record A~~endix, 87th Cong., 1st Sessa (1961), CVII, 762-76). 
3Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Plan..ning and the 
Political Process," American National SecuritYI ! Reader in 
Theory and Policy, eds. Morton Berkowitz and P. G. Bock 
~New York. The Free Press, 1965), p. 149. 
4seymour Harris, "Military Security or a Balanced 
Budget," Current HistoIT, XXXVIII (April, 1960), 203. 
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administrations of President Lyndon B. Johnson, and 
President Richard M. Nixon. 
Yet executive pressure to conform to the official 
line in public statements by Joint Chiefs of Staff members 
was countered by the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act which 
required the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when testifying before 
committees of Congress, to express their own outlook on 
military matters regardless of how it stood in relation to 
thelr" superlor s 1"". po lCY. 1 
Loyalty to their particular service also affected 
Joint Chiefs statements, as the individual Chief tended to 
bolster his own service needs or capabilities. While not 
down grading the other services each Chief, Commandant or 
Chairman did not overly praise the attributes of the other 
services. 
A further factor influencing Joint Chiefs viewpoints 
was their varying backgrounds. There was no single military 
mold from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff members were cast. 
Neither did all of their statements conform to a single 
viewpoint. 
Not all members of the Joint Chiefs have been 
graduates of the nation's military academies. General 
George H. Decker, Chief of Staff, United States Army, 
October 1, 1960 to October 31, 1962 was a graduate of 
lUoS .. Congre$sional Record ApI2endix, CVIIl, 7168. 
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Lafayette College in Pennsylvania. General Curtis E. LeMay, 
Air Force Chief of Staff from July 1, 1961 to W~rch 31, 1965 
graduated from Ohio State University. LeMay's successor 
General Paul T. McConnell, Chief of Staff until July 31, 
1969 received his Bachelors Degree from Arkansas' Henderson 
State College. Commandant David M. Shoup, who served in 
that position from January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1964, was 
a graduate of DePauw University in Indiana. 
Joint Chiefs' members reacted differently to the 
bureaucratic structure in which they functioned, as in the 
issuing of public statements. Admiral George W. Anderson, 
Chief of Naval Operations, June 22, 1961 to August 31, 1963 
was an outspoken critic of Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNarmara,1 who reportedly lost his option for a second two 
2 year term because of his pUblic statements. Unlike General 
LeMay who bluntly informed McNarmara of the testimony he was 
going to present to Congressional Committees, Admiral 
Anderson held back his critical views from McNarmara and 
then unleased his disagreements in Congressional hearings.) 
111Guys Who Get in Their Way," Time, LXXXI (May, 
1962). 28. 
21lStormy Days for the Navy," Time, LXJOGI (November, 
1963). 37. 
311Armed Forces. Bossing the Brass," Newsweek, LXI 
(May, 196:3), 37. 
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General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff United 
States Army, September )0, 1962 to July 5, 1964 and Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff July 6, 1964 til July )0, 1970 
was a member who did not complain in public or engage in 
"corridor grumping."l 
Although noted for his candid answers in Congressional 
Hearings General LeMay did not plant questions with 
Congressional aides. He also kept the press at arms length. 2 
The implication that other members of the Joint Chiefs 
planted questions with members of Congress before giving 
testimony should be noted. Considering the pressure under 
which Joint Chiefs public statements are made it is highly 
likely that individual members have used this method. How­
ever, the exact extent of such a practice is not known. 
Not all officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were 
recognized as combat heroes or had engaged in front line 
combat duty. General Wheeler, General Decker, General 
Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff United States Air Force, 
March 26, 1957 to August )1, 1961 and Wallace M. Greene, Jr., 
Commandant of the Marines, January 1. 1964 to December 31, 
1968, although serving in important staff position in 
their careers were noted more for their planning skills 
1l1Defensei Tension in the Tank," Time. LXXXIX (May, 
1967), 26-27. 
2U•S ., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965). eXI, No.2, 1622. 
9 
than for combat roles. l 
Other members such as General Harold K. Johnson, 
Chief of Staff United States Army, July 6, 1964 to July 2, 
1968, his successor William C. Westmoreland, Chief from 
July 3, 1968 to June 20, 1972, General Shoup and Admiral 
Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, August, 1955, 
to June, 1961, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, September 30, 1962 to July 5, 1964 and 
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer had extensive combat experience. 2 
Public reaction to Joint Chiefs of Staff statements 
was probably shaped not only by the position held by the 
officer but also from the personal image of each Chief. 
Although the extent to which the personal projection 
effected the message being conveyed is uncertain, it should 
be realized that each Chief had his own distinct pUblic 
personality which influenced responses to him. 
A drafter of the NATO Treaty who was called unre­
sponsive to the needs of President Kennedy, General Lyman L. 
l"Defensee Tension in the Tank," Time, p. 27: see 
also U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 
CVlll, No.3, 3523: u.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1961), CVII, No.9, 11714; U.S., Congressional 
Record, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), CIX, No. 18, 2J7~4. 
2"Armed Forcesl Renaissance in the Ranks," Time, 
LXXXVI (December, 1965), 30: see also U.S., Congressional 
Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIII1, No. 12, 16214; 
U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1960), CVI, 1081: "The Cold Ware Chief of Staff," Time, 
LXXVIII (July, 1961), 9; U.S., Congressional Record, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), CXIII, No. 11, 14601. 
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Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff United States Army July 1, 1959 
to September 30, 1960 was not known for a dynamic persuasive 
personality.1 
Soft . k humbl and d 1 re1""1910us2 Gspo en, e eep y enera1 
Johnson was called a "friendly computer'· whose concern for 
the enlisted men earned him the title of a "private's 
general".3 
An early advocate of geopolitics and world education4 
General White was known also for his brilliant mind and the 
continued maintenance of an air of confidence in the ability 
of the Air Force to accomplish its goals. 5 He was a leading 
6architect of the Air Force missile program. 
General Taylor was seen as the "most civilian minded 
general" and the '·most prestigious figure in the United 
States military establishmentl/.? Called an intellectual he 
11/The Cold War: Chief of Staff," Time, p. 10. 
2U •S ., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968), CXIlIl, No. 16, 21114. 
31/Armed Forces: Renaissance in the Ranks," Time, 
pp. 30, )2. 
4u.S., Congressional Record, CVII, No. 9, 11?14-15. 
5U•s. , Congressional Reco:r,d, CVII, No. 9, 11719· 
6u.s. , Congressional Record, CVII, No. 9, 11714-15· 
7"Vietnaml Soldier to Saigon," Newsweek, LXIV (July,
1964), 18-20. 
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was fluent in Japanese, German, Spanish, and French.! Known 
as Mr. "Flexible Response"2 he served as special civilian 
military advisor to President Kennedy from June 1961 to 
September 1962. 3 
General Leonard F. Chapman, Commandant of the Marine 
Corps from January 1, 1968 to November 29, 1971 was con­
sidered an expert in military management and a scientifically 
4trained organization man. 
An advocate of the Polaris submarine, Admiral Burke 
was a no nonsense, nose-to-the-grindstone worker,5 who 
believed the only way to break a man was with work. 6 In 
talking about the Pentagon he liked to say "there are a lot 
of poisoned wells in this desert".? 
l"The Cold Wars Chief of Staff," Time, p. 10. 
2U •S ., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
 
(196), CIX, No.5, 6488.
 
JI'Gen. Taylor to Head Joint Chiefs I Lemni tzer Named 
to Head NATO," Aviation W.eek, LXXVII (July, 1962), 2). 
4"A Management Marine," Newsweek, LXX (December, 
196?), 33. 
Su.s., Congressional Record Appendix, eVI, 1081. 
6U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 87th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1961}, CVII, 5694. 
7U•S., Congressional Record Appendix, 87th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1961). CVII, 5829. 
12 
Called the "diplomat" because he wasn't,l General 
LeMay had a pUblic image of being a tough and able World War 
II hero who continuously challenged Department of Defense 
policies. 2 In the pUblic mind he was more an image than a 
person, and was known as the big bomber man. 3 
Admiral David L. McDonald Chief of Naval Operations, 
August 1, 1963 to JUly 31, 1967 was noted for the position 
that if he could not live with a superior's policy he would 
either get that policy modified or resign.4 
Described as being "as colorful as a basket of 
frogs",5 General Decker's personality was further char­
acterized by the statement that "you could set a bomb off 
under his desk and he wouldn't turn a hair".6 As Army 
comptroller for three years he gained the managerial skill 
needed for the Army's top position. 7 
lU.S., con~ressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965). CXI, No. -, 1371. 
2U •S ., Congressional Record, CXI, No.2, 1621. 
3"From LeMay to McConnell--A Change to the 'New 
Breed' ," Newsweek. LXV (January, 1965), 16. 
4"Stormy Days for the Navy," Tim~, p. 37. 
Su.s., Congressional Record, CVIII, No. J, 3523. 
6"Armed Forces. The Quiet Ones," Time. LXXVI
 
(August, 1960), 16.
 
7U •S ., Congressional Record, eVIlI, No.3, 3523. 
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Admiral Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations from 
August 1, 1967 to JUly 31, 1970 when he became Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a reputation "for a computer 
like mind" and great leadership ability. A man of warm 
personality, he blended his qualities of a southern gentle­
1man with leadership and competence.
Not a dreamer but a leader who had a fine sense of 
the practical, Commandant Greene's credo was one of effi­
cient planning, preparation and training to insure combat 
2d o rea 1ness. 
A believer in physical fitness and mental gymnastics, 
Commandant Shoup exercised regularly and enjoyed playing 
chess. He believed chess forces a person to look over an 
entire problem instead of just one side of an issue, which 
in today's world is important. In training ~~rines he 
preferred to concentrate on the ability of his men to tangle 
with and defeat the enemy rather than on the teaching of 
hate. 3 General Shoup insisted that his Marines did not need 
instruction about Communist theory in order to fight them. 
4What was needed was knowledge on how well the enemy fought. 
lU.S., Congressional Record, eXIII, No. 11, 14601. 
2U•S., Congressional Record, CIX, No. 18, 23744. 
J"ShOUp of the Marines I We Teach Men to Fight--Not 
Hate," Life, 111 (March, 1962), 49-50. 
4"Uncle Dave," Time. LXXIX (February, 1962). 28. 
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Known as a "Soldier Statesman" General McConnell 
impressed his civilian superiors with his "sharp minded 
capabilities".l In his attempt to get Air Force programs 
accepted, he used the soft sell. 2 As an organization man 
he rated high in planning ability, in getting along with 
other people and in trust. Although a World War II flying 
general, he was not known to the public or controversial, 
and did not advocate any particular school of thought. 3 
After him, the top positions in the Air Force would go to 
a younger breed of officers who are products entirely of the 
4jet and nuclear weapons age. 
General Westmoreland was called "the model of a 
modern major general". Despite his Vietnam command he kept 
good relations with the news media. 5 According to military 
historian S.L.A. Marshall, Westmoreland possessed three 
attributes needed by a modern battlefield commander I 
1U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1965), eXI, 411-412. 
2"Changes for Air Forcel New Chief ••• New Tactics,rt 
[.~. News ~ World Report, LVIII (February, 1965), 16. 
3"From LeMay to McConnell--A Change to the 'New 
Breed'," Newsweek, p. 16. 
4"Changes for Air Forces New Chief ••• New 
Tactics," 1[.~. News ~ World Report, p. 16. 
5u.S., Congressional Record, CXIlII, No. 12, 16215. 
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"durability, popularity, and professional competence".1 
2Billed as a lucid thinker and a precise speaker, 
General Wheeler subordinated Army causes in the interest of 
overall military needs.) 
Despite the variety of experiences and personalities 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's were able to present 
a clear and overwhelmingly uniform image of the American 
policies of Deterrence and the Prevention of Nuclear War 
and Deterrence and the Acceptance of Limited War. This was 
due to the "conservative realism" of their professional 
military ethic distinctly characterized in the following 
manner I 
The military ethic emphasizes the permanence, 
irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature. 
It stresses the supremacy of society over the 
individual and the importance of order, hierarchy, 
and division of function. It stresses the con­
tinuity and value of history. It accepts the 
nation states as the highest form of political 
organization and recognizes the continuing likeli­
hood of wars among nation states. It emphasizes 
the importance of power in international relations and 
warns of the dangers to state security. It holds 
that the security of the state depends upon the 
creation and maintenance of strong military forces. 
It urges the limitation of state action to the direct 
interests of the state, the restriction of extensive 
commitments, and the undesirability of bellicose or 
lU.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968), eXIlII, No.4, 5306. 
2U•S ., Congressional Record, CIX, No.5, 6488. 
3"Merit Will Be Rewarded," Newsweek, LXIV (July,
1964), 19. 
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adventurous policies. It holds that war is the 
instrument of politics, that the military are the 
servants of the statesman, and that civilian con­
trol is essential to military professionalism.
It exalts obedience as the highest virtue of 
military men. The military ethic is thus pessi­
mistic, collectivist, historically inclined, 
power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, 
pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the 
military professi~n. It is, in brief, realistic 
and conservative. 
Affected by that military ethic, the Joint Chiefs' 
of Staff deterrent policy was also realistic and 
conservative. 
lHuntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 79. 
Chapter 2
 
THE COMMUNIST THREllT AND UNITED STATES
 
MILITARY RESPONSE FROM 1945 TO 1970
 
Between 1945 and 1970 the United States felt that 
the chief military threat to her security was the power held 
by Communist nations, especially that of Russia. Primarily 
in response to that threat the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
formulated deterrent policy in the 1960's. This was in 
direct contrast to the cooperation of these powers during 
World War II. 
The Allied alliance in World War II between 
capitalist America and Communist Russia was based on need 
and not on creed. As Allied interest coincided only on the 
1issue of defeating a common enemy, the victory over the 
Axis powers removed the binding element between Russia and 
the United States. In place of the Axis threat Russia and 
the United States looked upon each other as menaces to their 
2
respective conflicting national interests.
By the end of the war an aggressive Russia determined 
INorman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy. American 
Foreign Policy:, 1945-1960 (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co. 
Inc., 19(2), p. 1J . 
2Robert G. Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy In 
Perspective (Homewood, Illinois. Dorsey Press. 1969), pp. 
172, 177. 
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to pursue her own course in world affairs replaced Germany 
as the major force in Europe.! Backed by her military and 
economic power Russia embarked on a foreign policy designed 
to expand her influence and	 control of global affairs to 
2the fullest possible extent. 
Russian designs to upset the free world balance of 
power represented a global threat and conspiracy. In 
seeking world comination the Soviet Union brought about the 
struggle between freedom and terror. The spreading Communist 
"virus" needed to be contained to prevent further contamina­
tion of non-Communist areas and belligerent statements by 
Soviet leaders encouraged such fears.) 
Soviet expansionist ambitions were seen directly in 
her actions. From 1944 to 1946 Russia demanded that the 
former Italian colony of Libya be given to her. In 1945 
Russia demanded that a base in the Dardanelles be alloted 
to her control while the support of a revolution in Greece 
by bordering Communist nations further accentuated Communist 
ambitions.4 Partial American response included giving aid 
lGraebner, Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 15-16, 21. 
2R• Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The ~CYIOpedia 
of Military History From 1iQQ B.C. to the Present New York. 
Harper & Row, Pub. Inc., 1970), p. 1237. 
3Craebner, Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 109-110. 
4Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 182-183. 
19 
to Greece and Turkey to prevent their absorption by the 
Communist bloc and to keep them within the Western camp.l 
Russian failure to establish a leftist nationalist 
government in Iran owing to diplomatic pressure and the 
possibility of a sharp confrontation with the United States 
focused on would be Russian expansion at the expense of the 
freedom of small nations. During that crisis American 
military aid to Iran put the United States on the road to 
the formation of anti-Soviet military blocs. 2 
It is apparent that the United States perceived the 
Soviet Union as a threat to American security owing to the 
actual or potential use of Soviet armed forces. Russian 
subversive actions against nations in which the United States 
had interests further substantiated this view.) 
By 1946 the American public was so convinced of 
Russian aggressiveness that it felt another war, initiated 
4
most likely by Russia, would occur within twenty-five years.
That same year only the nuclear monopoly of the United States 
IGraebner, Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 40, 42. 
2wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 182. 
3pau1 Y. Hammond, The Cold War Years: American 
Foreign Policy Sincel2!±5"l'New York. Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., 1969), p~ 
4Thomas A. Bailey, ~ Diplomatic HistorY of the 
American Peopl~ (New York. Appleton-Century Crofts, 1969), 
p. 777. 
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gave her a military capacity comparable to that of the 
Soviet Union. 1 The rapid demobilization of American forces 
from twelve million to two million men between 1945 and 1947 
was not matched by Russian reductions. This led the United 
States to rely on nuclear weapons to provide a "re1.atively 
cheap" yet effective security.2 
Since 1945 the conflict and tension between the 
United States and Russia known as the Cold War has had at 
its strategic center the vast power that each possessed.} 
Fortunately, the issues of the Cold War in many instances 
4 
were better left unresolved than settled by war. 
For the majority of the Cold War years the clash of 
American and Soviet differences revolved around the fate of 
Europe since Russia desired to expand her hegemony in Europe, 
while the United States resisted that goal. 5 The American 
desire in Europe to see all European nations have the benefit 
of self determination was directly countered by the Russian 
policy of keeping Europe divided into two spheres of 
lGraebner, Cold War DiplomacI, pp. }8-39. 
2Temple Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy Today
 
(New York' Bantam Books, Inc., 1966), pp. 45-~6.
 
3Dupuy, The Enc;Vlopedia "of Military History, p. 1199. 
4Graebner, Cold War Diplomac~, p. 77. 
5Wesson, Soviet Foreign POlicy, pp. 178-179. 
21 
influence. 1 Within divided Europe the two Germanys remained 
the critical issue between East and West, with Berlin the 
most vexing problem.2 
This trend toward a permanently divided Europe was 
unavoidable by 1945.] Russian domination of Eastern and 
central Europe based on "physical occupation and military 
power,,4 required an appropriate counter balance, namely the 
presence of American military force in Western Europe. 5 
The loss of Czechoslovakia in 1948 further under­
mined the position of the West. 6 That same year, the 
attempt by Russia to pressure the West out of Berlin by 
means of a blockade forced Western Europe and the United 
States to concentrate on the Soviet military threat. 7 
America's deepening commitment to protect Europe in 
part stressed increased emphasis on military preparedness,8 
lGraebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 61. 
2Bailey, &Diplomatic History, pp. 853-854. 
]Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 25. 
4Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 34. 
5Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 180. 
6Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 45. 
7Hammond, The Cold War Years, p. 27. 
8Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 9. 
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for she saw the defense of Europe as second only to her own 
national security.1 The fall of Czechoslovakia and the 
Berlin blockade showed that compromise with Russia was 
impossible and hastened the creation of NATO as a means of 
2preventing further Soviet expansion in Europe. 
In responding to the Russian threat of overt aggres­
sion by establishing NATO,3 a status quo policy of soothing 
Western fears, preventing Soviet expansion and allowing 
Russia to keep her satellite nations was followed. 4 
Even the Marshall Plan which sought the economic 
recovery of Europe, was founded mainly on the compelling 
argument that it was necessary to halt the spread of 
Russian Communism. 5 While indeed rescuing Europe from 
political and economic disaster the Marshall Plan also 
resulted in the creation of points of strength in Europe 
useful in the containment policy.6 
IHammond, The Cold War Years, p. 74. 
2Wesson, SQvie~ Foreign Policy, pp. 187-188. The 
1968 Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia pointed up the Russian 
desire for security and domination of surrounding nations 
above all else. Bailey, ~ Diplomatic History, p. 917. 
)DUpuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, pp. 
1223-1224. 
4Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 48. 
5Bailey, &. Diplomatic Histo:rY, p. 800. 
6Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 4)-44. 
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Both President Truman and Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson advocated dealing with Russia from a position of 
strength and by the end of 1951 Truman had adopted a rigid 
stance to contain Communist aggression. 1 
Using counter force in areas threatened by Communist 
aggression, the policy of containment sought to make such 
hostile action too costly to pursue. It consisted of giving 
economic and military aid to nations facing Communist sub­
version and aggression, the creation of military alliances 
ringing the Soviet Union, and an increase in the American 
military bUdget. 2 Containment was a basic tenent of 
American foreign policy in the 1950's and 1960·s. 3 
While Russia favored keeping the status quo in her 
own sphere of influence, she encouraged change in Asia and 
Africa. Despite the desire of the newly developing nations 
to defend their independence while remaining aloof to the 
East-West struggle, Russia carried the Cold War into the 
E world. 4 non-uropean 
Korea tested the containment policy and the ability 
1Hammond , The Cold War Years, pp. 43, 58, 62. 
2Wanamaker, Ameri~an Foreign Policy, pp. 46-47. 
3Hammond, The Cold War Years. p. 116. 
4Graebner, Cold War Piplomacy, pp. 87, 90. 
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of the United States to apply it. 1 Given the position which 
had been developed by the United States, the overt North 
Korean attack on South Korea in June of 1950 could not be 
ignored. Communist success in taking over mainland China 
made it seem even more imperative that the Red tide be 
oK 2s t opped ~n oreal If it was not stopped in Korea, Communism 
could spread throughout Asia and Europe thereby threatening 
American national security and survival.) 
In Korea, the Soviet Union used proxies and puppets 
4in attempting to accomplish some of her goals. To prevent 
Russian success United States involvement forced President 
Truman to rearm the nation,5 an action which for the first 
time stopped Communist military aggression cold. 6 
Numerous military attitudes were affected by the 
Korean war. The United States settled for a limited war 
in accepting as its goal a status guo ante bellum position. 
It pointed up the willingness of American political leader­
ship to fight a war as it saw fit rega~dless of the 
1Wanamaker , American Foreign Policy, p. 47. 
2Wesson, Soviet foreign Policy, pp. 193-194. 
3Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 55. 
4Bailey, ~ Diplomatic Histor.1, p.819· 
5Hammond,Tbe Cold War Years, p. 41. 
6Bailey. ~ Diplomatic Histor.1, P' 827. 
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domestic political repercussions,l Red China's strength 
and aggression in Korea further encouraged American leader­
ship to stress the need for mutual defense treaties with 
Asian nations. Such treaties were for the purposes of con­
taining Communist expansion in that part of the world. 2 
The war also speeded up the rearming of West Germany, 
increased American military aid to NATO,) and saw the United 
States encourage Japan to rearm while attempting to make her 
a democratic bulkwark in the Far East.4 A renewed emphasis 
on foreign military bases resulted. 5 Furthermore, the 
limited war in Korea and later in Vietnam have shown the 
limitations placed on military conflicts as established by 
t h e mere posseSS1on 0 nuc ear capa 1 1 1e8.'f 1 b'l't' 6 
President Truman's containment policy was followed 
and accepted by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.? Under 
1Hammond , Th~ ~ War Years, pp. 50, 52. 
2Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 94. The 1954 
collapse of French rule in Indo-China left the United 
States as the leading sponsor of anti-Communist regional 
defense mutual security pacts for Asia. Dupuy, The 
Encyclopedia of Milita;ry Histoo:, p. 1247. 
)Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 51. 
4Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 816. 
5WesBon, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 19)-194. 
6Dupuy, The Encyclopedia .Q1. MilitarY History, p. 1201. 
7Bailey, A Diplomatic ljistQrY, p. 866. 
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Eisenhower's direction the build-up of containment alliances 
stretching from NATO to South Korea was completed. 1 Such 
alliances emphasized the need for collective strength, making 
aggression too costly. the use of foreign military bases and 
military aid to American allies. 2 
Eisenhower's outright acceptance of open military 
alliances at the expense of relations with neutral nations 
was dubbed "pactomania" by his critics. Critics or not. 
the alliance system served as a rigid application of the 
American policy of containment.) 
The Eisenhower Doctrine initiated by the Suez crisis 
of1956 and proclaimed in Y~rch of 1957, further indicated 
his policy of preventing successful Communist aggression. 
It was thought that advance notice of United States' resolve 
to promptly aid nations threatened by Communist aggression 
would prevent such aggression. 4 By pledging aid to any 
nation asking it to repel international Communism, the 
Eisenhower Doctrine followed the stereotyped response that 
change in foreign governments could be attributed to 
Communist ambitions and not self determination. S 
IHammond, The Cold War rears, p. 69. 
2wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, pp. 48-49. 
3Hammond, The Cold War YearS. p. 70. 
4Bailey, ! Diplomatiq History, p. 844. 
5Craebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 100. 
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This new policy was first used in 1958 when American 
troops were sent into Lebanon to protect that government 
from internal as well as external threats. 1 The view held 
by the United States of international issues as a struggle 
between Communism and freedom was clearly evident in the 
1958 Middle East crisis;2 a crisis which saw the overthrow 
of the pro-western government of Iraq and the sUbsequent 
attempts to overthrow the governments of Jordan and Lebanon 
by Arab nationalists backed by Russia.) 
During the Eisenhower administration military policy 
shifted from conventional weaponry to heavy reliance on 
nuclear power. Under the guidance of Admiral Arthur Radford, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the "New Look" in 
defense posture was initiated. It stressed nuclear strategic 
weapons and the means to deliver them while downgrading con­
ventional forces. The "New Look" attempted to use tech­
4
nology in order to save on manpower and money. No doubt the 
conviction that war could not be limited5 made nuclear 
weapons preferable. 
lGraebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 102. 
2Hammond, The Cold War Years, p. 119. 
3Samuel Flagg Bemis, ~ Diplomatic HistorY of the 
United states (New York. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 
1965), pp. 982-98J. 
4Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 74-75, 77. 
5Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 125. 
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The "New Look" caused Army Chief of Staff. Maxwell 
Taylor to resign in 1959 since he felt that such dependence 
on nuclear weapons left the United States with an inadequate 
level of conventional capabilities.1 
Containment was bolstered by the addition of "Massive 
Retaliation". Designed to eliminate any more Korean style 
conflicts, "Massive Retaliation ll stressed the freedom of 
action by the United States to respond, if need be, with 
nuclear weapons not only against the forces being directly 
used by an aggressor but also against any would-be sanctuary. 2 
This policy had two major limitations. First. was the un­
certainty whether the United States would use such weapons. 
3Second, was Russia's ability to retaliate in like manner. 
Yet, by the end of 1953 President Eisenhower gave the go-
ahead to contingency planners to count on using nuclear 
weapons in their Plans. 4 
The Russian change to the soft sell method after the 
death of Stalin in 1953 could not be handled by the doctrine 
of "Massive Ret8liation ll The new Russian approach of• 
enticing less developed nations with economic aid rather 
1Hammond, The Cold War Years. p. 103. 
2Wanamaker. American Foreign Policy, p. 47. 
}Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, p. 49. 
4Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 75-76. 
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than coercing them was potentially far more dangerous to the 
United states, and made "Massive Retaliation" unreasonable.! 
By 1960 the ability of Russia and the United States 
to shower nuclear weapons on each other made a nuclear 
response too risky, except as a last resort. Simultaneously 
the decision of Russian leaders on November 1960 to extend 
Communist influence through covert aggression, "wars of 
national liberation", "third party" struggles and the like 
was based on the nuclear capacity of the United States. 2 
"Massive Retaliation" while used as a threat in the 
Indo-China war between France and the Viet Minh was ultimately 
ruled out. 3 While American policy had edged away from the 
use of nuclear weapons, her military hardward and related 
military capabilities were not as readily adaptable to such 
a change. Military flexibility had been traded for economic 
considerations by President Eisenhower. 4 
In the 1ate 1950' s the American position of "Massive 
Retaliation II gave the United Statas only two options; either 
back down in face of conventional aggression or fight a 
1Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, pp. 49-50. 
2Wanamaker, American Foreign POlicy, pp. 49-50. 
3Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 95. 
4Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 83-104. 
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1nuclear war.
Consequently, since the development of nuclear 
weapons encouraged lower level conflicts fought under the 
"umbrella of mutual nuclear deterrence" the United States 
needed a policy to deal with such limited non-nuclear wars. 
Therefore the American reliance on "Massive Retaliation Jl of 
llthe late 1950's shifted to IIcontrolled and flexible response 
by the mid-1960's.2 
The Kennedy administration followed two major mili­
tary policies. One, was the policy of maintaining a 
strategic nuclear force that could survive a nuclear attack 
with enough power to retaliate effectively. The second, was 
the development of a broad range of conventional counter 
capabilities,J designed to give a flexible response capability 
. . . . 4ln any glven Sltuatlon. 
Kennedy increased military flexibility along with 
increasing the military bUdget. 5 Such a Jlflexible option" 
policy extended the United States' response beyond 
IBailey, ! Diplomatic Hist~, pp. 849-850. 
2Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Militanr HistorY, pp. 
1202-1204. 
3Hammond, 
_
The
- ----
Cold Wa~
-
Years, pp. 149-150.
...__.... 
4wanamaker, American £oreign ~olicy, pp. 50-51. 
5Hammond, The Golg War Years, p. 193. 
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1capitulation or possible nuclear war.
Overall, Kennedy's policy stressed peace and for­
feited the idea of America making the first nuclear strike. 
Also included was the search for the best defense at the 
lowest possible price, continuation of civilian control 
over the military, plus the desire to prevent nuclear war. 2 
Such a policy no doubt was established in part, 
because of the acceptance by President Kennedy that the 
United States could not have an utterly superior strategic 
force in relation to other nuclear powers.) 
In Asia President Kennedy inherited the problem of 
Laos which was in danger of falling to Communist inspired 
insurgents. Many feared that if Laos fell to Communist 
forces her neighbors, especially South Vietnam, could also 
fall into Communist hands. Initially President Kennedy 
wanted to take action to neutralize Laos but later decided 
to pUll back to a more defenseable position in South 
Vietnam.4 By the time of his assassination Kennedy had 
increased American troops in South Vietnam to sixteen thousand? 
lHammond, The Cold War Years, p. 159. 
2Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, pp. 50-51. 
JHammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 193-194. 
4Bailey, A Diplomati£ History, p. 879. 
)Bailey, ~ Diplomatic HistorY, p. 894. 
)2 
Upon unexpectedly assuming the Presidency, Lyndon B. 
Johnson was faced with the problem of how to protect South 
Vietnam against Communist aggression. The situation 
dramatically changed in August 1965 when North Vietnamese 
torpedo boats alledgedly attacked two American destroyers in 
the Gulf of Tonkin. In response to presidential prodding 
Congress enacted the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing 
President Johnson to take whatever steps were necessary to 
protect American forces from further attacks. 1 
Despite pUblic assurances that Americans would not 
fight an Asian war for Asians, that the United States would 
not escalate the war, and armed with the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, President Johnson increased American forces in 
South Vietnam from thirty-five thousand in 1965 to five 
hundred forty thousand by the middle of 1968. 2 
Arrival of those additional American troops prevented 
immediate Communist victory and eliminated any future 
possibility of military victory for the Viet Congo However, 
Hanoi clung to the chance that political repercussions in 
the United States would pressure American withdrawal.) 
Russia seemed to be less of a threat in the 1960's 
lBailey, ~ Diplomatic ~istory, pp. 899-901. 
2Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 215-219. 
JHammond, The Cold War Years, p. 219. 
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than in the early 1950's owing to a stronger Europe and a 
growing split in the Soviet Bloc. 1 However, the threat of 
Red China grew in that later period. The explosion of 
China's first nuclear bomb in 1964 was followed in June of 
1967 by her first hydrogen bomb. These developments added 
to the United States' fear that China might enter the 
Vietnam conflict. Reportedly China's position was that if 
the United States' escalation inclUded the bombing of the 
Red River dikes in North Vietnam or an attack on China, 
China would intervene. Disclaiming such actions by the 
United States quieted war talk in China. 2 
In the Americas Communist Cuba proved to be the most 
dangerous military problem for the United States in the 
1960's. This was due to the belligerent attempt by Russia 
to upset the strategic balance of power by sending some 
forty nuclear missiles to Cuba in 1962, along with other 
offensive material.) Russia was compelled to remove the 
missiles and some of the other related offensive weapons by 
the determination of the United States to use force if 
necessary in getting the Russian threat reduced. Nonetheless, 
as late as 1964 Cuba remained the strongest Latin American 
1Hammond , The Cold War Years, p. 201. 
2Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 207-209. 
)Bailey, ~ Diplomatic Hi$torY, pp. 882-884. 
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power because of continuing Russian aid. 1 
In her quest for world domination Soviet military 
aims included the buildup of a powerful military machine 
with emphasis on research and development programs. creation 
of a heavy industrial base to support an effective war 
machine. and elimination of American overseas bases capable 
of mounting an attack on Soviet territory. Also included 
was the desire to undermine NATO and other Western defense 
alliances and the spreading of Communism through "wars of 
liberation ll as in Vietnam. 2 
The threat of Communism did not allow America to let 
her guard down. Despite her search for peace. America was 
forced by Communist actions to break with many diplomatic 
and domestic traditions. The Truman Doctrine reversed the 
Monroe Doctrine by giving aid to Greece; the Marshall Plan 
did away with non-intervention; NATO membership shattered 
the non-alliance tradition; and the United States was faced 
with conscription and a wartime size military bUdget during 
peace time. 3 
By 1947 the United States had taken a get tough 
lBemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 
pp. 992-993· 
2wanamaker. Ameriean Foreign POlicY, p. 42. 
]Bailey, ~ Diplomatic Hi$tocr, p. 809. 
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stance toward Russia. 1 Since that time the Soviet Union has 
continued to challenge American interests through political 
and military blackmail and subversion. 2 Whatever method 
was called for, Russia was ready to use for the purpose of 
extending her power and influence.) 
Such a threat to the American nation was the problem 
that American military security faced in the 1960·s. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in forming their deterrent policies 
operated from this background. Their statements conveyed 
a continuing belief in the need to be on guard against 
the Communist threat, the need to contain Communism, the 
concern for being able to react in a strong enough fashion 
to combat Communist aggression, and the desire to keep 
American military alliances and the cooperative strength of 
the free world bolstered to an adequate degree for security. 
1Bailey, ~ D~plomat1c History, p. 796. 
2Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 20-21.
 
}DUpuy, The E.'ncyclopedia of Military HistorY, p. 1230.
 
Chapter 3 
DETERRENCE AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEA.R WAR 
Two basic deterrent doctrines were acceptable to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960·s. One, which will be 
called Deterrence and the Prevention of Nuclear War. was 
based mainly on the precept that the United States must 
retain sUfficient strategic nuclear forces capable of 
surviving a nuclear attack with adequate retaliatory power 
to destroy the aggressor. 
The second, Deterrence and the Acceptance of Limited 
War, stressed the idea that conventional non-nuclear war was 
more likely to come about than general nuclear war, there­
fore, preparation for that type of struggle would be 
increased. 
Although separate in many ways in their respective 
approaches to the attainment of national security, and 
located far apart in the possible destruction that could 
come about, they are interdependent parts of the whole 
strategic picture of military preparedness. 
A clearer perspective of the Joint Chiefs' of Staff 
views on deterrence can be gained from their outlook con­
cerning the over-all role of the military in the 1960's. 
It is from their basic understanding of this role that the 
narrower outlook on prevention of hostilities was formulated. 
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed the role of the 
military establishment remained basically the same as it had 
been for close to two hundred years, that is, the prevention 
of war which would involve the United States.1 The goal of 
such prevention was tied to the primary tasks of maintaining 
peace on terms acceptable to the United States2 and the 
protection of American lives and property.) Speaking in 
1965 General Wheeler observed I "We all want peace and 
tranquility along with our freedom.,,4 
l"The Military View--From the Top and From the Ranks," 
Tim~, XCIII (April, 1969), 25: see also "The U.S. Army of 
the 70's As Westmoreland Portrays It," !l.§.. News ~ World 
Report, LXVII (December, 1969), 1); U.S., c)ngreSSiOnal
Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960 , CVI, 4512: 
Curtis E. Le1'J!,ay, "Military Implications of Space, Achieving 
In-Being Protection Along with Progress," Vital §peeches Qf 
~ Day, XXVIII (May, 1962), 452: U.s., ~ongressional Record, 
59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), CXI, No.7, 9970. 
2U •S ., Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1960), CVI, No.9, 11221: see also Congressional Record 
Appendix, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (19621, CVIII, 59191 W. C. 
Westmoreland, "Talking About the Armya Promote the Common 
Defense," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXV (May, 1969), 4521 
U •S ., CQngressional Record, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), 
eVI, No.8, 10669. The promotion of the nation's general
welfare was also within the role of the military. Examples
included the building of the Panama Canal, construction of 
the Alaskan Highway and the conquest of yellow fever and 
tYPhoid fever. U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1968), CXIIII, No. 14, 17950-17951. 
JCurtis E. LeMay , "Civic Action by the Air Force, II 
Vital SReeches of the Day, XXX (December, 1963), 150: see 
also David L. McDonald, "The Merchant Marine Fleet," Vital 
Speechep; of: the Day, XXXI (February, 1965), 188. 
4u•S ., CongressiQnal Record Appendix, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1965), CXI, JOO. 
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General Lemnitzer rebutted the image of the military 
as an aggressive institution. Interestingly, he claimed 
1that the military neither wanted nor did it seek war.
General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke also felt that 
the military sought peace rather than fostering aggression. 2 
General Wallace M. Greene Jr. stated. "No one abhors the 
thought of war more than those who have Seen it first hand. It J 
General Decker stressed the same position. UNo element of 
our society is less war minded than is the soldier, for none 
4 pays in war a greater price. 11 Many of those who experienced 
5war did not advocate war, it was up to fools to hope for war. 
Apparently the paradox of the United States preparation 
l U•S ., Congression~ Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1960), CVI, 4143: see also U.S., Congressional Record, 
CVI, No.9, 11221. 
2U•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4510; see 
also U. s., C,mgressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1960), CVI, 2683; U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), eVI, 2183. 
3u•S ., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2d Sessa (1964), CX, No. 11, 14709: see also U.S., Congressional 
Record, 91st Gong., 1st Sessa (1969), CXV, No. 175, 10161; 
ItJestmoreland, "Talking About the Armys Promote the Common 
Defense," p. 454; "Why U.S. Will Win If War Does Come," 
[.~. News ~ World Report, LI (November, 1961), 55· 
4George H. Decker, liThe Nature of the Army Mission: 
Place in National Defense," Vital Speeches of the Day, 
XXVIII (September, 1962), 725· 
5Westmoreland, 'tTalking About the Army. Promote the 
Common Defense," p. 452; see also "Why U.S. Will Win If War 
Does Come," 11.. §.. News ! World Report, p. 55· 
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for war while searching for peace existed because of the 
need for the maintenance of a powerful national defense con­
ducive to national security.l Military power was not only 
required but demanded a constant and unending program of 
2
readiness. Immunity from aggressors could not be assured 
just because the United States had a peaceful outlook. The 
hope for elimination of armies was balanced by the need to 
face the harsh realities of the world. 3 The desire to ban 
war could be present,4 but the keeping up of "martial ardor" 
and a suitable degree of strength for defense purposes was 
a must. S 
Safeguarding of the American principles of "liberty, 
justice and human dignity", required not only an all out 
effort peacefully to solve the problems causing tension in 
the world but also the "essential" dedication of having the 
ability to defend the nation. 6 
l U •S., Congression?~ Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968), eXIIII, No. 13, 17314. 
2U. S ., Congressional Record, CX, No. 11, 14709. 
3Westmoreland, "Talking About the Army: Promote the 
Common Defense," p. 452. 
4U•S ., Congressional Record, exv, No. 175, 10161. 
5u •s ., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968), CXIIII, No. 13, 17313· 
6U•S., Congressional Record, CV1, No.9, 11221. see 
also U.S., Congref;>sional Record Appendix, cvr, 4510. 
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The preservation of peace through the possession of 
military strength was considered a major undertaking of the 
1government. At the very least it allowed the government to 
exercise its national policies. 2 
Deterrence, then, has been the foundation of United 
States military doctrine; the continuance of suitable 
military force which would prevent the enemy from engaging 
in military aggression to achieve his ambitions. This 
defensive doctrine sought to avoid any conscious attitude of 
aggression.) General Thomas D. White stated: "While our 
nation will never commit aggression, we must stand ever 
ready to defend our freedom.,,4 Also, the nuclear capability 
of the United States was not used or should it be used to 
l U•S., Congressional Record Appendix, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1962), eVIII, 4225. 
2U • S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
 
(1962), eVIII, No.5, 5790.
 
JEarle G. Wheeler, "The Design of Military Power: 
Only One Component of National Power," Vital Spe~ches of the 
Day, XXIX (December, 1962), 157. General Wheeler urged the 
deployment of the A.B.M. system in order to show Russia that 
the United States was not interested only in a first strike 
capability. "How to Prevent a Nuclear War: Warnings to 
Americans by Joint Chiefs of Staff," 1[. S. News ~ World Report, 
LXII (May, 1967), JJ. 
4U•S ., Congressional Record, CVI, No.8, 10669. 
However, Robert F. Kennedy disagreed. "One of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff said to me he believed in a preventive
attack against the Soviet Union." Robert F. Kennedy,
Thirteen Days I A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New 
York:· W. W. Norton & Co.Inc., 19b9L p. 119. 
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bring "a quick and successful" end to the struggle with 
Communism. 1 Still, that very power was essential in insur­
. her secur1. t y. 21ng 
Deterrent power in itself was not enough, for if it 
did not prevent war, the military had to be ready to win a 
struggle of any nature forced upon the nation while pre­
serving its institutions. 3 Yet, General Harold K. Johnson 
remarked that lasting peace was not to be found on the 
4battlefield but rather attained in the hearts of men. 
Weaponry of that time pointed up the necessity for 
avoiding "lapses in vigilance and misuse of power", it was 
"too prohibitive" to do so.5 
As one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff succinctly 
summed it ups 
The threat is real. It would be naive to think 
otherwise. This is not to say there will be nuclear 
war tomorrow, but the threat is very real. Remember, 
our job is to deter war, not primarily to fight one. 
lU.S., Congressional Record Appendix, eVIII, 4225· 
·· ,.,2U.;j., Congressional Record Appendix, CVIII, 4225 • 
3U•s ., Congressional Record, CXIIII, No. 14, 17313; 
see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 87th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1962), ClX, 5919; U.s., Congressional Record 
Appendix, CVI, 4512. 
4u•s., Congressional Record, CXIlII, No. 13, 17314. 
5U•S., Congressional RecQrd, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
 
(1964). ex, No. 10, 13607.
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We ar~ bound by our duty to arm our country so 
that 1f a war should come through some miscalcula­
tion, we would have the weapons and the resources 
to prosecute it successfully.l 
The threat was real since geographic isolation from 
the ravishes of war was no longer possible. Strong aerospace 
forces for the first time directly menaced the nation's 
survival. This, then was the treatest danger to the United 
States. 2 
Two post World War II strategic concepts, poles apart 
in their outlook on gaining security for the United States, 
were considered for possible use. The concept of "Fortress 
America" was rejected in favor of "Forward Strategy".3 
Basically the "Fortress America" concept consisted of 
withdrawing behind the natural ocean defenses of the Atlantic 
and Pacific. Such confinement of United States forces 
guaranteed sure defeat. Meeting Communist aggression along 
the outer-rim boundaries of the free world was deemed more 
suitable.4 
1warren Rogers, "The Power People: Gen. Earle G. 
Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff," Look, XXXIII 
(August, 1969), 20. 
2U•S., C n ressiona Record !Rpendix, 87th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1961 , eVIl, 8193· 
3U•S., Congressional Becord Ap£endix, CVI, 4510. 
4u.s ., Congressional Record, eVI, 11221, see also 
U.S., Congressional ~ecord Appendix, eVI, 4510. 
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In meeting the Communist threat along the periphery 
of the free world, "Forward Strategy" required the position­
ing of military forces overseas and the development of the 
capability to project additional military power beyond 
national borders as it became necessary.1 As Admiral 
McDonald expressed in November of 19641 "true defense 
begins overseas".2 
Portrayal of Communist aggression as the leading 
danger to United States security was common. 3 This was true 
whether such a threat was considered to be a monolithic or 
polylithic Communist danger. 4 uForward Strategy" and the 
prevention of Communist expansion went hand in hand. 
Bluntly focusing on the above union General Lemnitzer 
lLyman L. Lemnitzer, lIForward Strategy Reappraised: 
Military Aspects t " Vital Speeches of the Day, XXVI (September, 1960), 70b. 
2l\1CDonald, "The Merchant Marine Fleet,lI pp. 188-189. 
3U •S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 11, 14709; see 
also Arleigh A. Burke, lIDiscipline in a Free Society: 
Personal Acceptance of Responsibility, It Vital Speeches of 
the Day, XXVII (September, 1961), 681; U.S., Congressional 
ReCord, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), CIX, No.1), 17510; 
"Why Joint Chiefs Worry Over U.S. Survival," y..§.. ~ews ~ 
World Report, LXV (July, 1968), 28; U.S., Congress10na~ 
Record Appendix, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), CVIII, 7169; 
U.S. CQngressional Record, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), ~~Is~~~: ~i9~~1~;c~i~·NO~oi3;ei~~~~~lu~~~~~~~g~~:~i~~~r·'
 
Record, eVI, No.9, 11221. 
4u .s ., Congressional Record, eXI, No.7, 9970. 
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stated: "We have been on the losing end far too long a time. 
We cannot give up 1 more yard to Communism anywhere. lf ! 
This Communist threat since the end of World War II 
and the resulting conflict made collective security more 
2important than ever. Meeting this worldwide threat required 
a worldwide and collective strategy.) Treaty organizations 
such as NATO and SEATO represented such collective security 
and were considered inseparable from the national security 
of the United States.4 It was far better to have allies 
throughout the world than to pull back into a shell like 
military posture. 5 
Choosing between the two Communist giants, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff rated Russia as the most dangerous because 
of her growing nuclear strategic force. This military 
l U•S., Congressionl!,l Record, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1961), eVIl, No. 10, 1)06); see also Lemnitzer, "Forward 
Strategy Reappraised: Military Aspects,1f p. 706, "Danger 
Years for U.S. Just Ahead," g.§.. News ~ World Report,XLIX 
(July, 1960), 82, U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 
86th Congo, 2d Sess. (1960), CVI, 5838. 
2U •S ., Congressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1960), CVI, 6059. 
3u•S ., Congressional Record, CVI, No.9, 11221. 
4u •s ., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2684. 
Collective security was considered to be a cornerstone of 
the total security effort. U.S., Congressional Record 
Appendix, eVI, 4511. 
511Why U.S. Will Win If War Does Come," ll..§.. News ~ 
World Report, p. 54. 
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factor was seen as perhaps having the effect of increasing 
Russian confidence in her ability to attempt military or 
diplomatic ventures which would be disadvantageous to the 
United States. It was not that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
greatly feared a deliberate attack, but that probes, escala­
tion or miscalculation might bring war about. l Russian 
offensive and defensive forces appeared geared to the pri­
mary task of overcoming the lead the United States held in
 
2
the capability to wage nuclear war. Particular attention 
l"WhY Joint Chiefs Worry Over U.s. Survival," Q..§..
News ~ World Report, p. 28. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did 
not take a possible sneak attack lightly. U.S., Congressional 
Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), CVI, 4583-4584; 
U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), CVII, 540. As time passed the success of a sneak 
attack was seen as decreasing. Congressional Record, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), CIX, No. 15,20152. 
2 .U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1969), CXV, No. 208, 16773. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were 
not certain whether the overall Soviet objectives were 
strategic nuclear parity or superiority. In either case 
they believed that probable Soviet aims were one or more of 
the followings 
"First, to reduce the United States assured destruc­
tion capability--that is, our ability to destroy their 
industry and their people. 
Second, to complicate the targeting problem which we 
have in directing our strategic forces against the Soviet 
Union. 
Third, to reduce U.S. confidence in the ability to 
penetrate Soviet defenses, thereby reducing the ~ossi~ility 
that the United States would undertake a preemptlve f1rst 
strike against the Soviet Union, even under extreme provoca­
tion. 
Fourth, to achieve an exploitable capability, per­
mitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at con­
flict levels less than general nuclear war,n U.S., Congres­
sional ReQord, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), eXIII, No. 12, 
15545. 
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was paid to the increasing number of Russian ICBM's and 
ABM's,l and the dynamic growth of the Russian navy.2 
The Russian naval threat as seen by Admiral Moorer 
was composed of two basic military components. The first 
was the change in Soviet maritime policy from a defensive 
posture to an offensive posture, global in nature and 
capacity, This reversal occurred in 1956. The second 
component was the Russian submarine fleet. Consisting of 
over three hundred and fifty vessels of post World War II 
vintage, this modern fleet presented a three dimensional 
threat to American security. Of the submarine fleet, 12 
percent could launch strategic missiles without warning, 
16 percent carried missiles with a range of over four hundred 
nautical miles designed primarily to be used against land 
and sea targets, while the remaining submarines armed with 
their torpedoes and mines posed a dangerous threat to 
3American control of the seas. 
l U•S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968), CXIIII, No. 20, 26019. 
2Thomas H. Moorer, "The Soviet Navy: Our Ability to 
Meet the Challenge," Vital Speeches of the Day, "X.XXV 
(October, 1969), 7451 Thomas H. Moorer, "U.S. Seapower on 
the Move,lI Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXIV (November, 
1967), 84. 
JIVioorer, "The Soviet Navy: Our Ability to Meet the 
Challenge," p. 7431 Thomas H•. lV1oorer, liThe. Russian Navy," 
Vital Speeches of the Da~, ~V (~arch, 196~), )00-302;
"How Good are U.S. Defenses? , y..~. News ~ World Report, 
LXVII (December, 1969), 76-77· 
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In 1964 Red China exploded her first atomic bomb, and 
in 1967 her first hydrogen bomb. Apprehension over the grow­
ing nuclear capability of Red China added to the already 
difficult questions of what constituted an adequate 
deterrent. l 
The principle element found in the deterrent posture 
of the United States and the most important factor in pre­
venting nuclear war in the 1960's was her strategic offen­
sive strength. 2 "Fower for Peace", the position that in 
order to prevent nuclear war the United States must have a 
war winning capability, pervaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
thought.) 
Deterrent power gained its true effectiveness only 
11l1~lhy Joint Chiefs Worry Over U.S. Survival," [.§.. 
News ~ World Report, p. 28. 
2LeIV'l8.Y, "Civic Action by the Air Force, II p. 150; see 
also Burke, "Discipline in a Free Society. Personal Accept­
ance of Responsibility," p. 682; McDonald, "The Merchant 
Marine Fleet," p. 189; U.S., Congressional Record Appendix,
CVI, 2685; u.s., Congressional Record, CVI, No.9. 11221; 
U.S., Congressional Record, 8?th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
CVIII, No.2, 2464. Defensive forces were seen as adding 
a contribution to the overall deterrent goal, however, it 
was less important than the offensive capabilities. "Why
U.S. Will Win If War Does Come," g.2,. News ~ World Report, 
pp. 53-54. 
3U•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4510; see 
also U.S., Congr~ssional Record Appendix, CVII, 8194; U.S., 
Congressional Record, CVI, No.9, 11221-11222; U.S., Con­
gressional Reco~d, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), eXI, No.2, 
1624, u.s., CQngressional Recorg Appendi~, eVI, 2183· 
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when sufficient strength to win any war was assured.! The 
only "reliable guarantee" of peace was the ability to defeat 
any aggressor decisively. This response had to be retained 
. 2 
a t any prl.ce. 
Surviving a nuclear attack with enough offensive 
capability to devastate the aggressor was desired,) if the 
highest deterrent factor level was to be achieved. 4 
Military power of this nature was credible and visable. 
Also, it must be able to address a number of threats, to work 
along with other aspects of national power, to create oppor­
tunities as well as a capacity for reaction. Furthermore, 
retention of adequate forces must be had at all times. 5 
l U•S., Congressional Record, CXI, No.2, 1624; see 
also LeMay, "Civic Action by the Air Force," p. 150. 
2"Twinning& u.s. Needs to Get 'Tough Minded'," U.§.. 
News & Wgrld Report, XLIX (October, 1960), 26. 
)u.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 268); see 
also Moorer, "The Russian Navy," p. )02; J. P. McConnell, 
"The Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate I I A Safe Margin of 
Strategic Superiority,fl Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXII 
(May, 1966), 457: Moorer, "U.S. Seapower on the Move," p. 8); 
Lemnitzer, "Forward Strategy Reappraised: Military Aspects," 
p. 708; "Danger Years for U.S. Just Ahead," g.§.. News ~ 
World Report, p. 76; U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No.9, 
11221; U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVII, 8193. 
U.s., Congressional Record, CVI, No.1), 17787. 
4"Why u.S. Will Win If War Does Come," Q.§.. News ~ 
World Repor~, pp. 53-54. 
5Wheeler, IlIrhe Design of Military Power: Only One 
Component of National Power," pp. 157, 1591 see also U.S., 
Congressional Record, CVI, No.9, 11221. 
Strength to the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not mean 
only military capabilities. It inclUded a range of inter­
acting ~lements such as the spiritual and material resources 
of the nation, economic power and determination to uphold the 
cause and a valid thought-out strategy.! 
As established, the mere possession of the material 
means to retaliate in itself did not comprise the complete 
deterrent goal sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
will to use the means was definitely required. 2 Without the 
will on the national level to employ the required force 
wherever, whenever and for the required span of time needed, 
all the military hardware created for the deterrent goal was 
considered useless.) Such will power came not from the 
military but from the nation, since the military served only 
as a "mirror" of society reflecting the image of that 
society. If the nation had the will then the military had 
it also. 4 
lWestrnoreland, "Talking About the Armyl Promote the 
Common Defense," p. 452; Wheeler, "The Design of Military 
Powerl Only One Component of National Power," p. 157· 
2U•S ., Congreasional Record, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), CVII, No.5, 6080; see also U.S., Congressional
Record, CVI, No.9, 1122); Westmoreland, "Talking About the 
Army I Promote the Common Defense," p. 454. 
3U•S•• Congression.al Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968), CXIlII, No. 12, 1~61. 
4Westmoreland, "Talking About the Army. Promote the 
Common Defense, lip. 454. 
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General LeMay stated that while the will to use force 
to achieve a particular goal was but one of several factors 
in the deterrent structure, it was a must unless the nation 
was prepared to have the credibility of all deterrent fac­
tors suffer "proportionately... 1 
Misunderstanding on the part of Russia or Red China 
on the degree of willingness by the United States to stand 
firm in the face of aggression could invite new probes, 
increased support of subversion and possibly even overt 
2
aggression on their part. The United States should project 
an image which included the "will and the heart ll to protect 
her interests. 3 
A clear understanding of the military strength of 
the United States would act as a powerful deterrent in pre­
4venting nuclear war. The American capacity for military 
reaction showed any enemy that aggressive action would 
1The other factors being (a) forces in existence, (b) public understanding of those forces. IIProtection 
With Progress," Time, LXXVIII (September, 1961), 17· 
2U•S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1s t Sess.
 
(1967), CXIII, No. 17, 22562.
 
}IlHow Good Are U.S. Defenses?", g.§.. News & World 
Report, p. 75. 
4J • P. McConnell, liThe Role of Airpower in Viet-Nam: 
Strategic Persuasion," yital ?peeches of the. Day, XXXlr 
(October, 1965), 12; see also U.S.,.Congress~onal Reco~d 
Appendix, cvr, 2183; U.S., 90ngressl.onal Record A'Ppend~x, 
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), eXII, 2162. 
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prove too costly for them to initiate. l This theme was 
constantly underscored. 2 
Another point impressively made was the ability of 
the United States to defeat any aggressor. 3 Repeatedly the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the enemy how much stronger 
l U•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4511; 
see also "Why U.S. Will Win If War Does Come," U.§.. News ~ 
World Report, pp. 53-54; "How to Prevent a Nuclear War: 
Warnings to Americans by Joint Chiefs of Staff," ~.S. News 
& World Report, p. 33. Unacceptable damage was defined as 
Tl} destruction of the enemy's capability to continue war 
is assured, (2) war would end on conditions suitable to the 
U.S., (3) the enemy's objectives would not be reached (4)
the enemy's destruction is assur'ed. McConnell, "The 
Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate': A Safe ~argin of 
Strategic Superiority," pp. 457-459. 
2LeIVlay, "Civic Action by the Air Force," p. 150; see 
also Moorer, "U.S. Seapower on the Move," p. 83; McConnell, 
"The Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate' I A Safe Margin of 
Strategic Superiority," p. 457; U.s., Congressional Record, 
CVI, No.1, p. 1254; uTop General's Rebuttal to Attacks on 
Military," U.§.. News ~ World Report, LXVI (June, 1969), p. 
14; U.S., Congressional Record ADpendix, CVI, 218); "Why 
U.S. Will Win If War Does Come," !l.§.. News ~ World Report,
PP' 53-54; "How to Prevent a Nuclear War: Warnings to 
Americans by Joint Chiefs of Staff," g.§.. News ~ World 
Report, p. 33; U.s., Congressional Record Appendix, eVI, 
l4:584. 
3McConnell, "The Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate': 
A Safe Margin of Strategic Superiority," p. 457; see also 
U.S., Congiessional Record ApPendix, CVI, 4510-4511; U.S., 
Congressional RecQrd Appendix, CVI, 2183; "Why U.S. Will Win 
If War Does Come," U.§.. News ~ World Report, pp. 53-54; u.S., 
Congressional Record Appendix, eVIl, 5l4:0; Lemnitzer, lIForward 
Strategy Reappraised: Military Aspects," p. 708; U. S. , 
Congressional Record Appendix, eVI, 4584; u.S., Congressional
Record, eXIIII, No. 13, 17314; u.S., Congressional Record, 
CX, No. 10, 13608; U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), CVIII, 4825; "Why Joint Chiefs Worry
Over U.S. Survival," Q.§.. !'Jews ~ World Report, p. 28; "We're 
Powerful--Why Be Fearful?", 1l..~. News! World Report, XLIX 
(October, 1960), 76. 
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the United States was than they.1 Conversely any down­
grading of United States' capabilities was seen as perhaps 
2misleading the Soviets into starting a world war. General 
LeMay did warn of the alarming decrease in the American 
margin of strategic superiority) predicting even the 
possible loss of such superiority at some unspecified 
future date. 4 
The price of aggression was shown to be so high that 
no advantage would be gained through hostile action. These 
points were emphasized in terms which opponents of the United 
States could precisely understand. 5 This was accomplished 
by taking into account not only what the United States 
l U•S ., Congressional Record, ex, No. 10, 1)608; see 
also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, eVIII, 7169; 
George C. Wilson, "LeMay Charges U.S. is Losing Its 
Strategic Force Superiority." Aviation Week, LXXVI (March,
1962). 2); "We' re Powerful--Why Be Fearful7", ![.§.. News ~ 
World Renrrt, ~. 76; u.s., Congressional Record, 86~h Cong •• 
2d Sess. 1960), eVI, No. 10, 12796; u.S., Congress1onal
Record Appendix, eVI, 2184. U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, 
No.9. 11222. 
2 lflf War Came Now Who '1Jould Win? u.s.? Russia?", 
~.~. News ~ World Report, XLVIII (February, 1960), 48; U.S" 
Qong!'esaional Record, eVI, No.1, 125)-1254. 
)IIWhy u.s. Will Win If War Does Come," !I.§.. News ~ 
World Report, p. 51. 
4Wilson, "LeMay Charges U.S. is Losing Its Strategic
 
Force Superiority," p. 2).
 
5U•S .• 9ongressional Record, eVI, No.9, 11221; see 
also "Danger Years For U.S. Just Ahead," Q.§.. News ~ World 
Report, p. 76. 
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thought was needed to win should war come about, but also by 
considering the enemy's outlook on the same question, for it 
1was the enemy who was to be prevented from causing war.
Making nuclear war too costly for the party or 
parties involved clearly was a basic stipulation of the 
overall deterrent factor, for every nation had a cost level 
or "nuclear threshold" above which restraining influences 
no longer acted as a sUfficient deterring force. This 
"nuclear threshold" was a dynamic not a static level, that 
was influenced by many factors which were not only variable 
but also unpredictable. Despite this complexity the thres­
hold should be raised and kept above other nations' willing­
ness to engage in nuclear war. This was accomplished by 
maintaining a "convincing strategic superiority".2. 
However, a possibility did exist that if a nation 
should conclude that its attack and defense capabilities 
would limit damage to an acceptable level, whatever it may 
be, the deterrent forces of the United States would no longer 
deter and "the first principles of (United States) security 
policy would be gone".) General McConnell rejected the idea 
lLemnitzer, "Forward Strategy Reappraised. Military 
Aspects," p. 707. 
2McConnell, "The Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate'. 
A Safe Margin of Strategic Superiority," p. 457. 
3"How to Prevent a Nuclear Wars Warnings to Americans 
by Joint Chiefs of Staff," 1!.§.. News ~ World Report, p. 33· 
54 
that because the United States would not risk nuclear war, 
neither would other nations. What deterred the United 
States	 would not necessarily deter Russia, Red China or other 
1 powers. 
A more somber tone was used in acknowledging that 
both Russia and the United States could annihilate each 
2
other, and that there was no defense at that time against 
saturation of nuclear weapons over a single target area.) 
What, then, were the fundamental strategic concepts in vogue 
at the	 time when such destructive weapons existed and when 
a fool	 proof defense was lacking74 
The concept adapted to this task had as its aim the 
destruction of the aggressor's ability to wage war. Other­
wise, through civil defense and other operations the aggres­
sor might be able to reduce possible losses to an acceptable 
level of risk, while pounding United States' cities to 
1M:cConnell, tiThe Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate's 
A Safe Margin of Strategic Superiority,lI p. 457. 
2U•s ., Congressional Record, CVI, No.1, 1254; see
 
also U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No.9, 11221.
 
3t1Little Wars--How Ready is U.S.?", [.§.. News ~
 
World Report, L (May, 1961), 70.
 
4The Air Force defined strategic warfare as "opera­
tions designed to destroy. the enemy's capa~ility and will to 
continue" war. This entailed the destructl.on of industrial, 
military, and urban complexes in areas controlled by the 
enemy. McConnell, "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Naml 
Strategic Persuasion," p. 12. 
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·· 1 A .obl1V10n. s 1n the case of Russia, it was not enough to 
hold only her cities as nuclear hostages, for their destruc­
tion would not prevent remaining offensive nuclear weapons 
from being used against the United States, and might tempt 
Russia to launch a first strike. This was a Counter Force 
and not a Counter Population approach. 2 
Counter Force was considered the best deterrent in 
that it would destroy or neutralize the offensive forces the 
enemy counted on winning with.) As the very least, had it 
failed to prevent nuclear war, Counter Force would have 
provided the "minimum limitation of damage under the worst 
possible condition".4 It provided the best dividend that 
could be gained from any strategy.5 
General McConnell stated that Counter Force effective­
ness depended on the strategic superiority of the United 
1 flDanger Years For U. S. Jus t Ahead, II !I.§.. News §f 
World Report, p. 79. 
2LeMay, IICivic Action by the Air Force," p. 150z see 
also "Danger Years for U.S. Just Ahead," y..§.. News ~ World 
Re~ort, p. 79. The role of Counter Force as defined by 
General LeMay was lithe ability to destroY,the :;ggresso~'~ 
strategic offensive system, thereby reduc1ng h1S capab111ty 
to attack us. 1t U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13608. 
3U•S., Congressional Record, CX! No. 10, 13608; see 
also U.S., Congressional ~eco~ Append1x, CVII, 8194. 
4U•S., Congressipnal Record, CX, No. 10, 13609. 
5U.s • t Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13609. 
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states. He attacked the concept of nuclear stalemate that 
assumed strategic parity on behalf of the major nuclear 
powers. Conspicuous among General McConnell's statements 
was the thought that the United States could lose its stra­
tegic advantage and with it national survival.1 General 
LeMay warned that the continued need for strategic super­
iority should not be overshadowed by such convenient posi­
tions as "mutual stalemate lt and, or "mutual deterrence".2 
Likewise the notion that "they" like the United States sought 
accommodation based on reasonableness was rejected. 3 
According to Generals LeMay and McConnell, sustained 
. "" d 1 "1 ""t 4strateg1c super10r1ty depen ed on techno og1ca super10r1 y. 
Prudent attention was paid to the continued need for main­
taining the technological superiority which the United 
States held in 1961. This was needed if military deterrence 
power was to survive. 5 The exigency of keeping abreast of 
technological advances was measured not only in the cost or 
lMcConnell, tiThe Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate': 
A Safe Margin of Strategic Superiority," pp. 457, 459. 
2u.s. , Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13608. 
3u•S • , 90ngressional Record, CXIlII, No. 20, 26020. 
4U•S ., Congressional Record, ex, No. 10, 13608; see 
also McConnell liThe Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate': A 
Safe Margin of'Strategic Superiority," p. 456. 
5U•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, CVIIl, 7169. 
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time element but in the possible devastation of cities and 
the resulting loss of lives. 1 General Thomas D. White urged 
that the United States should not rely on static weapons 
2systems in a dynamic technological age. 
General Wheeler acknowledged that although the United 
States made progress with weapons systems, so too did Russia 
and Red China utilize their technology to produce weapons at 
an increasing rate that directly threatened the United 
States. 3 General LeMay indicated that the Russians were 
more successful in applying technology to weapons than the 
United States.4 
General Wheeler gave prominence to the importance of 
the new technology by stating: 
To accept heightened risk and a less stable 
deterrent as a national posture would confuse un­
thinking personal preference for real-world policy 
alternative. The choice demanded by the new tegh­
nology is still between the quick and the dead. 
l U•S., Congressional Record, CXI, No.7, 9970. 
2U•S ., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
 
(1961), CVII, No. 10, 13863.
 
3"ToP General's Rebuttal to Attacks on Military," 
U.S. News & World Repo~t, p. 141 see also U.S., Congres­
sionar:RicQrd, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), eXIlII, No. 20, 
26746. 
4Wilson, "LeMay Charges U.S. is Losing Its Strategic 
Force Superiority," p. 23· 
5l1ToP General's Rebuttal to Attacks on Military," 
Q.~. New~ ~ World Report, p. 14. 
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Yet, owing to the then minimum 4-5 year period needed 
for advanced estimation of desired capabilities, or even a 
greater lead time owing to the rapidity of technological 
1change this area represented a weak link in deterring war.
Technology did not progress at a uniform pace. For 
example, Anti-submarine warfare lagged behind other areas, 2 
while successful application of technology as in nuclear 
propulsion of ships and possible propulsion of air borne 
craft was applauded by General White.) Outer space, however, 
provided a new dimension for application of technology for 
military use, thus causing increased problems for the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in providing a proper deterrent. 
One of the four basic reasons for the United States 
space effort was national defense. 4 Although the peaceful 
intentions of the United States with regard to the space 
1Henry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National 
Securit~ (Cambridge, Massachusetts I Harvard University 
Press,-1958), p. 40. 
2U•S., Congressional Record ~ppendix, 87th Cong., 
20. Sess. (1962), CVIII, 482. 
3U•S ., Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) CVI No.8, 109921 see also "Battle for a Nuclear 
Navy I 'Will'McNamara or Congress Win?", J1..§.. News ~ World 
Report, LX (June, 1966), 45· 
4The other three reasons were scientific progress, 
n.ation.al prestige and commercial advantage. U.S., Congres­
sional Record, 88th Cong., 20. Sess. (1964). ex, No. 13, 
16603. 
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medium were reaffirmed, the policy of the Joint Chiefs of 
1Staff was to secure space from would-be hostile powers.
Space was seen as a potential threat and, therefore, no 
enemy should be allowed to develop capabilities in that 
realm before the United States did. 2 
Space had direct military value. As the fortunes of 
nations have crested and tumbled upon their ability to use 
their environment, whether land, sea or the sky or a com­
bination of them, so too space was seen as playing a similar 
role. The very survival of the United States depended on 
3her conquest of and superiority in space. Leadership in 
whatever transpired there must be held by the United States. 4 
Application of the new technology was needed to gain 
l U•S ., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968), eXIlll, No. 12, 15905; see also U.S., Congressional 
Record, CX, No. 13, 16603-16604. 
2t1Congress Seen Key to Military Space Role," Aviation 
Week and Space Technologx, LXXVIII (Ma~ch, 1963), 26; see 
also U.S., Congressional Record Append1x, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1963), CIX, 1202-1203; It Why U.S. Will Win If War 
Does Come," U.§.. News and World Report, p. 55· 
3U•S ., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), CVII, No. 10, 13863; see also L~May, t1Mili-u;ry
Implications of Space. Achieving In-B~~ng Protect10n Alo~g 
With Progress p. 455; U.s., Congress10nal Record Appendlx,It 
CVII, 8194; "Danger Years For U.S. Just Ahead," 1[.§.. News ~
 
World Report, p. 79. For military us~ of the moon see U.S.,
 
Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), CXII,
 
No. 11, 13867.
 
4U•S., Congressional Record Appendix, CIX, 1202-1203· 
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an effective space defense, Such a defensive capability 
included the ability to detect, track and inspect any 
unidentified space object, as well as the capability to 
destroy objects in space should they prove to be hostile. 1 
From the vast expanse of space to the depths of the 
oceans the prevention of nuclear war was a major goal of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's. Simultaneously the 
Chiefs sought to deter non-nuclear war. For both types of 
conflict General Wheeler aptly summed up American deterrence 
policyl 
I have argued, am arguing, and will argue for an 
American military posture which is (1) strong, but 
not belligerent; (2) too determined to be frightened 
and too strong to be defeated; and (3) unwavering, 
despite setbacks, disappointments and opposition in 
following that cause which we know is the right path2to organize a stable and durable peace. 
1U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 1), 16604. 
2"TOPS With the lviilitary--and With Politicians, Too," 
~.~. News! World Report, LXVI (May, 1969), 16. 
Chapter 4 
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF LIMITED WAR 
Russia's first nuclear detonation in 1949 removed the 
monopoly on nuclear weapons held by the United States and 
brought about the possibility of mutual destruction of both 
1super powers should a general nuclear war occur.
From that point on the military establishments of 
Russia and the United States have been faced with the dual 
tasks of adopting nuclear power for military purposes while 
maintaining and improving conventional non-nuclear means of 
waging war. 2 
Along with the changing material means of waging war, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were confronted with the greatest 
transition of strategy and doctrine in military history.) 
In response to the changes brought about by the nuclear age, 
and the challenge of Communist non-nuclear aggression the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff were faced with the need for a con­
ventional non-nuclear deterrent policy. 
1R• Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The hncyclo­
pedia of Military: History from 3500 B.Q.. to the Present (New 
Yorke :Harper & Row, Pub. Inc., 1970), p. 1199. 
2Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, 
p. 1199. 
3DUpuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military 
History, p. 1199. 
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The possession of certain weapons, according to 
General Decker in 1961, did not mean that they had to be 
1
used. This was seen in the non-use of nuclear weapons by 
the United States in her struggle against Communist aggres­
sion. The thought that the ability to win a nuclear war 
would deter Communist aggression proved incorrect. On the 
contrary, Communists have been able to take aggressive 
military action providing it did not bring about a nuclear 
conflict. 2 
The direct Russian nuclear threat to the United 
States was readily discernible in the opening years of the 
1960's. More subtle was the threat represented by limited 
war which allowed Communist powers to nibble away at the 
collective strength of the free world, and which if unop­
posed, would lead to ultimate defeat.) Aggression of this 
nature continued because the Communist World was not con­
tent to allow its neighbors the right to free and independent 
governments. Such a threat required continued opposition 
for it was accepted that whenever a nation lost its freedom 
l"Little Wars--How Ready is U.S.? .. , 1[.§.. News! 
World Report, L (May, 1961), 65· 
2"We're Powerful--Why Be Fearful?", 1[.§.. News ~ 
World Report, XLIX (October, 1960), 7)-74 . 
)U.s., con~ressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960J,b871 see also U.S., Congressional Record, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), CVI, No.9, 11221. 
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that of the United States was placed in greater jeopardy.1 
Whether it was the strategic advantage of the United 
2States or the development of Soviet nuclear capabilities, 
non-nuclear war came to be viewed as the most likely form of 
aggression. 3 It was unlikely that the Soviet Union would 
gamble on an all out nuclear attack realizing the cata­
strophic losses she could receive. Rather, believing she 
had all but eliminated massive retaliatory action, except 
perhaps by an attack upon a NATO member, localized aggres­
sion seemed the suitable option. 4 
The very effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent 
increased the need for further development of a conventional 
deterrence policy.5 Necessary, therefore, were forces in 
6being which could respond to a broad range of threats. 
l U•S ., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
 
(1967), CXIII, No. 37, 36197-36198.
 
2U•S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
 
(1964), CX, No. 10, 13608-13609.
 
)George H. Decker, liThe Nature of the Army Mission: 
Place in National Defense," Vital Speeches of the Day, 
XXVIII (September, 1962), 725: see also "Why U.S. Will Win 
If War Does Come," !J..§.. News ~ World Report, LI (November, 
1961), 55. 
4U•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, 87th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1961), eVIl, 540. 
5Thomas H. fifloorer, liThe Russian Navy," Vital Speeches 
of the Day, XXXV (March, 1969), 302. 
6u •s ., ~ongressional Record Appendix, eVIl, 540. 
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Lack of conventional strength could leave the United 
States with only two choices in the face of Communist aggres­
sion; the withdrawal of opposition or retaliation with 
nuclear weapons. Conventional strength provided graduated 
military, diplomatic and psychological responses plus 
expanded time for using them. 1 
The possible consequences of limited war forced the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop not only a nuclear deterrent 
policy but also a non-nuclear deterrent posture. While 
General LeMay claimed that there was no single military 
point of view in the United states,2 Admiral Burke lucidly 
stated the basic consensus of the need for two deterrent 
conceptsr 
While it would be foolish to ignore the possi­
bility of a surprise nuclear attack, it is time to 
recognize that over emphasis on such an attack tends 
to inhibit original and constructive thinking on 
the over all Soviet threat particularly in the 
limited and cold war fields. These are the fields 
on which the Soviets will feel more and more at 
liberty to probe. It is entirely to their advantage 
to have the United States judge each Soviet move in 
terms of only one solution--massive nuclear retalia­
tion--for they may believe that such a response is 
less and less likely to come about.) 
l U•S ., Congressional ReCord Appendix, CVII, 540. 
2Curtis E. LeMay, "r~ilitary Implications of"Sp~cer 
Achieving In-Being Protect10n Along w1th Progress, V1tal 
Speeches of the Day, XXVIII (May, 1962), 452. 
3U•S ., COngressional Record Appendix, CVII, 540. 
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Limited war was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff as more likely to occur in the 1960's than general 
nuclear war. General Shoup in pleading for increased 
military preparation for such conflicts stated: 
There is a general consensus with which I heartily 
agree, that limited wars are the most probable type 
of action that we may have to fight. Al though of 
less threat to national survival than general war, 
limited engagements merit our close attention.1 
The Army view strongly supported the possibility of 
non-nuclear war. General Lemnitzer in 1960 believed this 
to be the case owing to the Soviet nuclear capacity and the 
lack of such capacity by Communist China. 2 In May of 1961, 
General Decker indicated the Army had felt for some time 
that conventional war was more likely to come about than 
nuclear war.) As shown in Laos the problems in the 1960's 
would most readily be those of Communist inspired subver­
sion, controlled terror and infiltration carried on mainly 
1U.S., Congressional Recor!! APJ2endix, 86th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1960), CVI, 20821 see also nWe're PowerfUl--Why 
Be Fearful?", 1).§.. News ~ World Report, 73. The NaVY"also 
accepted the idea of lim1ted war. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. 
Seapower on the Move," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXIV 
(November, 1967), 83. 
2U•S., Congressional Record ApPendix. 86th Cong •• 
2d Sess. (1960~t CVI, 6059. see also "Organization Changes 
Opposed by Lemnitzer," Aviation Week, LXXIII (September, 
1960). 38. 
311Littie Wars--How Ready is U.S.?'I, [.§.. News ~ 
World Report. p. 65· 
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by guerrillas, not a big war.! 
Strategic and tactical developments weighed the odds 
in favor of non-nuclear warfare. 2 To down grade the threat 
and possibility of non-nuclear war would be ignoring the 
well-equipped two million man army of Russia and the two and 
one-half million man army of Red China.) 
This trend also observed by Admiral Burke deprecated 
the ability of having a nuclear capability as the only 
response to actions of other nations. Such a reaction was 
not adequate. More stress was to be placed on limited war 
capabilities.4 
During the Eisenhower administration the doctrine of 
massive retaliation based on the assumption of unrestricted 
use of atomic weapons guided American military POlicy.5 
ll1Little Wars--How Ready is U.S.?", [.§.. News! World 
Report, p. 68. 
2Decker, liThe Nature of the Army Mission: 
National Defense," p. 726. 
Place in 
3Decker, "The Nature of the Army Mission: 
National Defense," p. 725· 
Place in 
4"we're Powerful--Why Be Fearful?", 1[.§.. News ~ World 
Report, pp. 73-74: see also J. P. ,MCC?nnell, "The ~allacy of 
the 'Nuclear Stalemate': A Safe ~argln of Strateglc Super­
iority," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXII (May. 1966), 458. 
5Temple Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy 10day 
(New York' Bantam Books. Inc., 1966). p. 47· 
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This at least was the basic understanding as seen by the 
general pUblic. However, as early as 1960 members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that limited war needs were to 
get increased attention and allocation of resources. 
In the aborted Kennedy presidential era, General 
Taylor, an outspoken critic of massive retaliation and a 
proponent of "Flexible Response", saw the latter become the 
backbone of defense policy.! 
"Flexible Response" was seen as the ability of the 
United States to meet military threats along the entire 
range and level of intensities upon which aggression could 
occur. Since the threat ranged from massive Soviet tank 
attacks to jungle ambush, from nuclear weapons to the cross 
bow, a salient point in the Joint Chiefs' speeches was the 
need for adopting the "Flexible Response" concept in thought 
as well as in deed. 2 Proficiency in carrying out such a 
1 "C ommand Shake Up," Time, LXXX (July, 1962), 12. 
2u•s ., Congressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1960), eVI, 2685; see also "Twinning: U.S. Needs to 
Get ·TOUg.h Min.. ded' ," ~'~' News ~ World Report, XLIX.(October,
1960), 26, "We're Powerful--Why Be Fearful?", 1[.§.. News ~ 
World Report, p. 73; Earle G. Wheeler, "The Design of Mili­
tary Powers Only One Component of National Power," Vital 
Speeches 2f the Day, XXI~ (December, 1962), 1.59; U.s., Con­
gressional Fecord ~ppend1x, 88th Cong., 1st Sess~ (196~r;­
CIX, 5919, "Organization Changes OPP?sed by LemnJ.tzer, . 
~yiation Week, p. )8; U.S., CongressJ.onal Recor~, CX, No. 10, 
1J608; Moorer, "U.S. Seapower on the Move," p. 84: W. C. 
Westmoreland, "Talking About the Army:. Pro~ote the Common 
Defense," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXV (May, 1969)~ 451; 
U.S. Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1905), CXI, 
No.7, 9970, u.S:-;-Congressional Record, 89th Cong.,~st.Sess. 
eXI, No. 20, 27626; Decker, "The Nature of the Army MJ.sSJ.onl 
Place in National Defense," p. 726. 
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response required the ability to campaign with or without 
nuclear weapons.1 Accord'1ng to Admiral McDonald, Berlins, 
Quemoys, Lebanons, Suezes, Cubas and Vietnams, would con­
tinue to happen and the United States should be prepared to 
deal with such situations. 2 
Readiness for nuclear war was not incompatible with 
"Flexible Response".3 American security required both con­
ventional flexibility and nuclear war preparedness. 4 General 
LeMay, better known for his massive retaliation position 
rather than his advocacy of limited response, favored 
building up limited war forces providing there was the under­
standing that llyou cannot fight a limited war except under 
the umbrella of strategic superiority ll.5 General McConnell 
concurred saying that besides being a powerful deterrent 
1"Little Wars--How Ready is U.S.?", g.§.. News ~ World 
Report, p. 6.5: see also Decker, "The Nature of the Army 
Mission: Place in National Defense,lI p. 726. 
211In a Troubled World--Navy's Role in Cuba, Panama, 
South East Asia," J1..~. News §£ World Report, Lvre (March, 
1964),70. 
3Moorer, "U.s. Seapower on the Move," p. 83· 
4Decker, liThe Nature of the Army Missions Place in 
National Defense," p. 726. 
'George c. Wilson! "L;May.ChargesU.S. i~Losing Its 
Strategic Force Superior1ty, ~vl.ation Week, ?CXV1 (March,
1962), 23. As in the case of Lebanon, the ~.S: w~uld not 
have dared entered "without strategic super1or1ty • 
~"·--------------------11111-
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force. this "umbrella" allowed greater freedom for statesmen 
to act in dealing with local conflicts and crises.! Stra­
tegic deterrent forces allowed for effective employment of 
tactical forces in limited conflicts. 2 Finally general 
nuclear deterrent forces kept limited wars limited. 3 
Reliance was not to be placed on a single weapons 
system. The use of nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear conflict 
was inappropriate and could lead to an uncontrolled situation. 
Dependence on nuclear ballistic missiles alone did not allow 
the President the retention of desired flexible responses to 
a wide range of lesser provocations. Mixed and balanced 
land, sea and air forces,4 including manned aircraft and 
missiles, gave the President the means of retaining initia­
tive at all levels of conflict or confrontation, thereby, 
I J • P. McConnell, "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Nam: 
Stratep'ic Persuasion,lI Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXII 
(Octob~r, 1965), 12. Herein, it was seen as deterrin~ 
limited conflicts. U.S., Congressional Record Append1x, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), CVII, 8193· 
2Curtis E. LeMay, "Civic Action by the Air Force,lI 
Vital Speeches of the Day, XXX (December, 1963), 150; see 
also U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13608. 
3u•s ., congressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1960L eVI, 2184; se~ also McC~nne;l, "The Role of 
Airpower in Viet-Nama Stra~eg1c Persuas10n, p. 14; U.S., 
eQngres8ion~1 Record Append1~, eVIl, 8193; u.s., Congres­
sional ReCord, ex, No. 10, 13609. 
4Decker, liThe Nature of the Army Missions Place in 
National Defense," p. 726. 
'lJIII~,:--------------------._
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reducing the danger of enemy miscalculation that the United 
States could not respond without risking a missile exchange. 1 
Even the tactical use of small nuclear weapons on 
military targets in the battle zone could lead to the use of 
strategic nuclear weapons. This was a key reason why a dual 
capability to fight large or small wars without nuclear 
2weapons should be present.
United States responsiveness to limited war should 
be based on prompt speed of movement into trouble spots to 
prevent exploitation of power vacuums. In itself speed of 
action could produce a desired deterrent factor. Effective 
counter action also included the ability to use precise and 
appropriate responses in each situation. 3 As in nuclear 
deterrence policy, the needed determination to prevail in 
such situations came from the moral-psychological strength 
of American convictions. 4 
l"Gen. LeMay's Case for New Strategic Aircraft,1t 
Aviation Week & §.pace Technology, LXXX (1964), 21; see also 
Decker, "The Nature of the Army Missions Place in National 
Defense,1t p. 726. 
2U •S ., Congressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 
20. Sess. (1960), CVI, 4143· 
3U•S ., Congressional Record, CVI, No.9, 11222; see 
also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, ~VI! 20~2; Moorer, 
"U.S. Seapower on the Mov~," p. 8~;.Lyman L. Lemn;tz~r, 
ItForward Strategy ReappraJ.sedl ~hlJ. tary Aspects, V~ tal 
Speecl1es of the Day, XXVI (September, 1960), 707, U.s". 
Congression~l Record, CX,No. 10, 13608, U.S., Congresslonal 
Record ~endix, eVI, 2184. 
4U •:s-, • , Congressional Record, CVI, No.9, 11222 • 
- ---------------.
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Forward strategy allowed for the prompt reaction to 
Communist military aggression. The positioning of forces 
right up against the Bamboo and Iron Curtains allowed for 
immediate reaction on the spot. Strategic reserves provided 
for movement to crises in other locations. Reserve com­
ponents were slated for use should expansion of ready forces 
be needed in case of an extended effort.1 Note, it was the 
reserves not the draftees that were to be used in an extended 
effort. 
American willingness to back words with action was 
2 
seen as shifting Russian activity to indirect confrontation. 
The tactical forces of the United States had apparently con­
vinced the Communist World that aggression, on the scale of 
Korea, involved unacceptable risks, thus forcing them to 
operate at the lowest end of the scale of violence, that of 
covert aggression and subversive action. 3 This belief 
lU.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2684; see 
also Thomas H. r.1oorer, "The Soviet Navy: Our Ability to 
Meet the Challenge," Vital Speeches Qf the Day, XXXV • 
(October, 1969), 745; U.S., Congressional R~cord Append~x, 
CVI, 6059; "We're Powerful--Why Be Fearful? , !l.§.. News ~ 
World Report, p. 74. There was no ~eed to post forces.near 
every trouble spot. U.S., Congress1onal Record Append1x, 
CVI, 2184. 
2Harold K. Johnson, "Vietnam. Comparisons and Con­
victions," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXIV (January, 1968), 
169-170. 
3U•S ., Congressional Record, ex, No. 10, 13608. 
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certainly did not survive the severe test of the limited 
war in Vietnam. 
In exploiting any physical or moral weakness in the 
free world, the Communist sought to keep the risk to them­
selves at a minimum. Russia realized the perils involved in 
limited armed aggression and according to Admiral Burke pre­
ferred to use "puppets and stooges", the loss of which would 
not endanger her; should the danger become too great they 
could be abandoned. 1 
Communist military forces were able to support Cold 
War goals, propaganda campaigns, general nuclear war, subtle 
forms of subversion and open military participation in 
geographically restricted conflicts. 2 
Such conflict would most likely take place in the 
underdeveloped areas of the world; the Middle East, Africa, 
Latin America, and the Asian periphery.) Quemoy, Lebanon 
and Suez showed that a flexible, diversified, conventional 
force capability was highly important if American foreign 
policy was not to be handicapped by lacking the right amount 
lU.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2183· 
2u•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, CVII, 2683. 
3u•s ., eQngre~sional Record Appendix, eVIl, 540. 
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of force at the right time.! Flexible response allowed for 
"sel ec tive, fine tuning of na tional ac tion," rather than 
reliance on a "on/off ll switch which offered little choice 
other than a calculated overt use of power. 2 
It is of interest to note that American preparedness 
and involvement in Vietnam was needed to bring about an era 
where the "conference table would loom ever larger and the 
battlefield smaller and smaller in the settlement of inter­
national disputes".) 
Clearly the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's 
accepted the idea that conventional non-nuclear limited war 
was more likely to come about than general nuclear war. 
They gave high priority to the development of a flexible 
response policy to fit all levels of military counter action. 
The Joint Chiefs' belief that limited non-nuclear war 
would more likely occur than nuclear war was proved in 
Vietnam. America's response to the Vietnam conflict was 
based on the flexible response concept. 
l U•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, eVIl, 540; see 
also Wheeler, "The Design of Milita~ Powerl Only ?,ne Com­
ponent of National Power," 160; Dav1d L. McDonald, Sea 
Power Selectivityl Naval M.obility,1t Vital Speeches of the 
DaX, XXXI (December, 1964), 124. 
2MCDonald. "Sea Power Selectivity:. Naval M?bil~t:y,1I 
124. Flexible Response allows for select1ve and d1s~r1m1nate 
use of forces as situation dictates. Moorer, "U.S. :::>eapower 
on the Move," p. 83. 
3U•s ., CongressionEl.l Record, eXIII, No. 37, 36197. 
Chapter 5 
VIETNAM: FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IN LIMITED WAR 
The emergence of many new nations after World War II 
which lacked the capability to defend themselves against 
covert or overt aggression, and the avowed Communist goal of 
world domination increased the military and political 
commitments of the United States in the 1960·s. Such 
commitments were made to protect the freedom and stability 
of those nations. 1 
According to General Johnson, of the over one 
hundred significant instances between 1945 and 1965 in which 
armed violence was employed in the political process of 
sixty-eight nations, Communist participation was prominent 
in at least 50 percent. General Johnson saw no reason why 
such a trend would not continue in the affected under­
developed areas of Latin America, Africa and southeast Asia. 
Vietnam as part of this trend represented the larger mani­
festation of aggressive Communist involvement in inter­
nalonat · 1 1 ~cs. 2pol·t· 
lU.S., Congressional ~ecord, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965), eXI, No.7, 9970. 
2U•S ., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), eXI, No. 20, 27624. 
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The struggle in Vietnam was viewed not as an isolated 
incident, but as part of the Communist blueprint to gain 
world power either by wearing down the United States in a 
series of local wars, or if United States' strategic power 
should slip, destroying her in a nuclear war.! In accepting 
this specific challenge of unending Communist aggression, 
the containment of Communist expansion was once again a 
prime reason for United States' involvement. 2 
In theory the prevention and successful containment 
of Communist aggression in South Vietnam would prevent more 
serious aggression in the future. 3 If Communist ambitions 
were realized the United States would at a later time be 
forced to fight Communist aggression somewhere else, perhaps 
1J. P. McConnell, "The Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stale­
mate': A Safe Margin of Strategic Su~eriority," Vital 
Speeches of the Day, XXXII (May, 1966), 459; see also U.S., 
Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIIII, 
No. zli, 32030, Congressional Record AJmendix, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1966), CXII, 2162-2163. 
2U•S ., Congressional Record, CXIIII, No. 24, 32030; 
see also Harold K. Johnson, "Vietnam. Comparisons and 
Convictions,fI Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXIV (January! 
1968), 169; Harold K. Johnson, flThe D:fense of Freedom J.n 
Viet-Nam,fI Department of State Bulletln, LII (February, 
1965), 177: U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), eXII, No.5, 5815· 
3U•S ., Congressional Record, CXIIII! No: 24; 32930: 
see also Johnson, "The Defense of Freedom 1.n Vl.et-l~am, 
~. 177; u.s., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965), CXI, No. 16, 21453· 
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at a location muoh closer to her own borders. 1 
In this first of Khrushchev·s· "wars i 2of 1 beration," 
the aggressive policy of North Vietnam was seen as requiring 
to a limited extent, a military response. General Giap, 
military chief of the armed forces of North Vietnam, was 
cited as stating that the immediate goals of his nation were 
the protection of North Vietnam, the overthrow of the 
government of South Vietnam and the uniting of all Vietnam 
under Communist rule. 3 
General Chapman felt that the attempt to conquer and 
destroy South Vietnam required the full prosecution of the 
war by North Vietnam. 4 Such a desire to seize absolute con­
trol in the south through persuasion and terrorS indicated 
that it was more a case of Communist aggression than a 
1wallace M. Greene, Jr., If Vietnam. The Issue and the 
Response,lf y'ital Speeches of the Day, XXXIII (June, 1967),
511, see also U.S., Congressional Record, CXIIII, No. 24, 
32030 J Earle G. Wheeler, "Vietnam a Military Appraisal, II 
Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXIV (Augu~t, 1968}, 615,; "General 
Greene Tells the Story of Vietnam War, y.~. News ~ World 
Report, LXI (September, 1966), 37-38, U.S., Congressional 
Record, CXI, No. 16, 21453· 
2Greene, IIVietnam: The Issue and the Response,1I 512, 
see also U.S., Congressional Record, CXI, No. 16, 21453· 
JU•s ., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIIII, No. 20, 26020. 
4U•S ., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), CXV, No. 167, 12536. 
5U•S ., Congressional ~ecorg, eXI, No. 20, 27624. 
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. i 1popu1ar upr1S ng. 
In 1960 General Lemnitzer outlined the limited war 
policy goals of the United States. They oonsisted of the 
need for quick reaction to prevent successful Communist 
aggression, the application of the precise degree of force 
needed to defeat the aggressor without risking expansion 
into a nuclear conflict and the desire to limit the loss of 
non-combatants lives to the greatest extent possible. This 
limited response was likened to killing the rats in a com­
munity without destroying the neighborhood. 2 The Vietnam 
war has not been fought in l-ine with such a policy. 
Unlike North Vietnam the basic political goals of 
the United States were limited in design and scope.) These 
goals included providing security for South Vietnam,4 con­
vincing North Vietnam that she was not able to take over 
l U•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, 89th Cong., 
1st Sessa (1965J, CXI, 2495. 
2U•S., Congression~l Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 
2d Sessa (1960), CVI, 6059· 
3William C. Westmoreland, "Army Cutbacks--The Risks," 
[.§. News ~ World Report, LXVII (September, 1969), 71. 
4w• C. Westmoreland, "Talking About the Army: Promote 
the Common Defense," Vital Speeches of the ~ay, xxxy (N~y, 
1969), 454: J. P. McConnell, "The Role of AJ.rpower :tn VJ.et­
Nama Strategic Persuasion," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXII 
(October, 1965), 15: "General Greene Tells the ~tory of . 
Vietnam War" U.S. News & World RePort, p. 40; u.s. Ch~l.ces 
in Vietnam:' Views of Three Military Men," 1[.§.. News ~ \'iorld 
Report, LX (February, 1966), 27· 
A 
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South Vietnam by force,l creating conditions suitable for 
self determination of southeast Asian nations,2 and the 
extension of aid to those southeast Asian nations that needed 
it to combat Communist pressure.) Prevention of the loss of 
, 1 t' 4nat~ona pres 1ge, and the averting of the potential danger 
of Communist victory in South Vietnam to American national 
security were additional objectives. 5 
Vietnam was a test case in preventing successful 
6aggression without destroying the aggressor. While the 
United States could have destroyed North Vietnam almost 
l U•S ., Congressional Record, CXIIII, No. 20, 26020. 
2U•S ., Congressional Record, 91stCong., 1st Sess. (1969), exv, No. 161, 11815; see also U.S., Congressional 
Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), alII, No. 11, 1)865; 
U.S., Congressional Record, 91stCong., 1st Sess. (1969),
CXV, No. 175, 10160 J Westmoreland, "Army Cutbacks--The 
Risks," u.s. News & World Report, p. 71; Johnson, "Vietnam I 
Comparisons, and Convictions," p. 169. 
3U•S ., Congressional Record Appendix, eXI, 2494. 
4"General Greene Tells the Story of Vietnam War," 
~.2. News ~ World Report, pp. 37-38. 
5U•S ., Congressional Record, CXIIII! No: 24, J2~30; 
see also Johnson "The Defense of Freedom 1n V1et-Nam, p. 
177' "General Gr~ene Tells the Story of Vietnam War," Y. .§.. 
New~ & World Report, p. 37; Greene, "Vie-c:ame The Issue 
and the Response," p. 512 J U.S., CongressJ.onal Record 
Almendix, eXll, 2162. 
6U•S., Congressional Record! exv, No. 161, 118151 
see also McConnell, "The Role of A1rpower in Viet-Name 
Strategic Persuasion," p. 12. 
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XhptJ 
-~}=:, 
overnight, this was not done as it could have triggered a 
general nuclear war, the very type of occurrence the mili­
tary wanted to avoid. Such devastation was not needed nor 
was it in line with the expressed policy and intention of the 
.
natl.on. 1 
American military goals and actions were limited. The 
"classic objective of warfare--the overthrow and total defeat 
of the enemy" was not pursued. 2 Even during the period of 
rapid United States' escalation of forces into South Vietnam, 
General McConnell in March of 1966 and General Wheeler in 
June of 1968 asserted that the limited goals of the United 
States did not include the destruction or unconditional 
surrender of Hanoi. J Invasion of North Vietnam and the 
overthrow of its government were goals inconsistent with 
American desires to keep the conflict limited.4 
American restraint was also shown by the lack of "any 
expansionist desires" and the willingness of the United 
lMcConnell, "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Nams 
Strategic Persuasion," p. 12. 
2U•S ., Congressional R.ecord Appendix, eXI, 2495· 
JMcConnell liThe Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate's 
A Safe Margin of Strategic Superiori ~y, If p.. 458; see also 
Wheeler, "Vietnams A Military Appral.sal, p. 61J: U.S., 
Congressional Record, eXI1I1, No. 20, 26020. 
4U•S., Congr~ssional Record, eXI111, No. 20, 26020; 
see also Wheeler, IIVietnam. A Military Appraisal," p. 61J. 
4 
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states to attain her objectives through negotiations rather 
than insisting on a military victory.l Negotiations were 
intended to achieve American goals not to bring about defeat. 
Neither should they serve as a face saving device to cover 
American withdrawal. 2 
General Johnson was convinced that the Communist 
inability to gain victory on the battlefield would not be 
alleviated at the conference table. What North Vietnam could 
not gain from military aggression would not be given on the 
diplomatic front.) In direct opposition to North Vietnam's 
goals, any agreement reached was to include the freedom and 
security of South Vietnam. 4 
Despite limitations placed on military actions, North 
Vietnam was not spared from damage. Such damage was used in 
attempting to convince Hanoi that the cost of aggression was 
too high to be continued, especially since her goals would 
lU.S. Congressional Record Appendix, eXI, 2495; see 
also U.S., C~ngressional Record Appendix, 90th Cong •• 1st 
Sess. (196?L CXIII, 1416. 
211hnd the War Talks? What General Wheeler Thinks," 
~.~. News ~ World Report, LXIV (January, 1968), 10. 
JIlArmed Forces: Renaissance in the Ranks," Time, 
LXXXVI (December, 1965), J4. 
4[V! C . 11 liThe fa.llacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate' t 
.c onne , . . " 458A Safe Margin of Strategic Super10rlty, p. • 
------------00
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not be accomplished. 1 
Admittedly North Vietnam was able to continue her 
aggression for an extended time. But, in doing BO she was 
forced to accept the destruction of her economy, and the 
2loss of population. It was expected that such losses, plus 
the failure to achieve her military goals would cause North 
Vietnam to cease her hostile actions.) In brief, North 
Vietnam was to be made aware that aggression, like crime, 
4does not pay, and that continued aggression forced the 
United States to punish her further. 5 
Victory in Vietnam required the application of offen­
sive actions including the bombing of North Vietnam. 6 In 
attempting to break the will and capability of North Vietnam 
1U. S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXII, 216); 
see also flAs a Top General Sees the War Now," 1I.§.. News Sf 
World Report, LXII (January, 1967), 14. 
2U •S ., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXllI I, No. 20, 27059 J see also "General Greene Tells 
the Story of Vietnam War," 1I.~. News ~ World Report, p. 38. 
3U •S ., Congressional Record Appendix, eXI, 2495· 
4McConnell, "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Nams 
Strategic Persuasion," p. 15· 
SU.S., Congressional Record, CXV, No. 161, 11815; 
see also U. S., Congressional Record Appendix, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1966), CXII, ~42. 
see6U•S ., Congressional Record, CX~I, No. 11, 13865; 
also U.S., Congressiona,l Bgcord Append1x, CXII, 2162. 
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to continue the war, the policy of "strategic persuasion" 
was used. Unlike the purpose of strategic bombing in World 
War II, "strategic persuasion" in the 1960's was not intended 
to help bring about a complete military victory. As a 
flexible tool of foreign policy it al]owed for the step by 
step bombing of selected targets, while keeping military 
involvement below the level of an uncontrolled conflict. By 
applying measured increases of pressure to Hanoi, it was 
hoped that the high price of aggression would be more than 
she was willing to pay, and would bring her to the conference 
table. 1 
The claim was made that the destruction of troops, 
interdiction of supply lines and removal of North Vietnam as 
a sanctuary weakened her ability to support aggression in 
South Vietnam. 2 
At times even military targets such as airfields, 
missile sites3 and the port of Haiphong were off limits to 
1rv;cconnell "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Nam: 
, "A' • 0Strategic Persuasion," pp. 12-13; see also l.rpower. ver 
North Vietnam " Aviation Week & Space Technology, LXXXVII 
(August, 1967), 21; McConnell,-IIThe F~ll~cy o~ t~e '~~uclear 
Stalemate', A Safe Margin of Strateglc Superlorlty, p. 
458; u.S., Congressional Record Appendix, eXII, 442. 
2 11U •S • Choices in Vietnaml Views of Three Mili~ary 
Men" U.S. News & World Report, pp. 27-28: see also U.;;).,Q.on~ressrQnarRecord, CXIl, No. 11, ~J8661 fv1CC?nne~l, "The 
Role of Airpower in Viet-Nam Strateg1.~ P~rsu~sl~n~ ~pp. 12­
131 "Airpower Over North Vietnam," AV1.a tl0n ~~eek ~ Space 
l'echnolog.y, p. 21. 
. . V· t a ~a'r," _Uo_S.. o3"Air Power--What it is DOlng l.n 1e nm ~ '.... 
News & World Report, LX (May, 1966), 29· 
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bombing provided they did not interfere with bombing mis­
sions or as long as the United States could get by without 
attacking them. 1 
Civilian population centers were not to be attacked 
deliberately. Although some civilians were killed it was 
not because they were the intended target,2 as in Hanoi and 
Haiphong the industrial centers of those cities, not the 
populations were the targets.) 
The policy of strategic persuasion in Vietnam was 
based on decisions of higher civilian authorities. General 
McConnell clarified this in a trite but satisfactory manner: 
The simple military solution would, of course, be 
to destroy the out-of-countxY LNorth Vie1nam7 base 
supporting the in-country LSouth Vietnam! guerrillas. 
For important political considerations, however, our 
national leaders have authorized air strikes only 
against selected military targets in North Vietnam 
and agaknst the enemy troops and transportation 
system. 
Starting in 1965 and continuing to the end of the 
decade there is a trend in the Joint Chiefs' of Staff state­
ments that indicates displeasure with such a bombing policy. 
Despite the response by one member that it would be 
lliGeneral Greene Tells the Story of Vietnam War, II 
Q.~. News ~ World Report, p. ]8. 
2Wheeler, Earle G., "How to Fight the War in Vietnam," 
Q.§.. News ~ World Report, LXII (February, 1967), ]9. 
Ju.s., Congressional Recorg., CXII, No. 11, 1J866. 
4u.s ., Congres§iona1,. Racor£! Appendix, cxrr, 216J. 
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inappropriate to comment publicly on such limitations as 
ample time had been provided to state opinions to superiors 
and committees of congress, other viewpoints indicate such 
disappointment. 1 
Providing a possible excuse in case of defeat in 
Vietnam, the bombing limitations were looked upon in the 
following manner. It would have been much more effective if 
the bombing had been less gradual. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff called for a "sharp sudden blow which would paralyze 
the enemy's capabilitY",2 but this was not done. Bombing 
pauses and the sUbsequent relaxing of pressure on the enemy 
only allowed him to be "that much better off".J 
According to General McConnell, in 1965 the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had recommended that ninety-four targets in 
North Vietnam receive a livery severe application of air power" 
causing their destruction. This was disapproved. If the 
United States had bombed North Vietnam extensively in 1965 
when North Vietnam lacked the defenses it possessed by 
August 1967, the military situation would have been signifi­
cantly better. Such bombing might have prevented casualties 
l"Air Power--What it is Doing in Vietnam War," Q.§.. 
New2 ~ World Report, p. 28. 
37. 
2"More of the Same," Time, LXXXX (October, 1967), 
J"More of the Same," Time., p. 37· 
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received during the go slow period. By going the route of 
gradual bombing, Hanoi was able to build up her defenses and 
develop her reconstruction capability.1 
Bombing halts were considered unfortunate. 2 They 
were viewed as causing additional casualties.) By giving 
Hanoi a sanctuary the military found itself in the position 
of a "narcotics squad" in pursuit of pushers who could not 
enter their headquarters. 4 
Although the military risk was acceptable, the 
failure of productive negotiations during bombing halts, 
caused further consternation. 5 
The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff entailed 
the belief that the enemy could only be defeated by destroy­
ing areas placed off limits, such as the thirty mile buffer 
zone between China and North Vietnam. 6 Also advocated was 
l"If U.S. Hadn't Pulled Its Punch," Q.~. News ~ World 
Report, LXIII (October, 1967), 10. 
2U•S ., Congressional Record, CXIIII, No. 20, 27059. 
JGreene, "Vietnam I The Issue and the Response," p. 
512. 
4McConnell, "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Nam: 
Strategic Persuasion," p. 13· 
5 Cutbacks--The Risks," !I.. §.. NewsVlestmoreland, "Army 
~ ~Qrld Report, p. 71. 
6u.s ., Congres~ional Record, elV, No. 161, 11815· 
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the heavier bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.1 They accepted 
the view that continuous bombing of North Vietnam would have 
seen the conflict over or nearly Over by December 1969.2 
The bombing policy was inconsistent with two points 
of deterrence. First, that the winning or containing of 
limited wars without delay was necessary.) Second, limited 
bombing failed to use military force "efficiently and effec­
4tively" to gain victory. It also did not allow for sus­
tained and increasing pressure, called "the prologue to 
victory" •5 
The gradual increase in bombing was not advocated by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It fitted the enemy's plan of 
action and did not allow for the most effective use of 
I' 
6 power, 
l"More of the Same,ll Tim.e, p. 37. 
2'H I'he Army and Vietnam. The Stab in the Back Complex," 
Time, XCIII (December, 1969), 26. 
Ju•s., Congressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 
2d Sess, (1960), CVI. 2082. 
4U•S., Congressional Record Appendix, 88th Cong., 
2d Sessa (1964), CX, 2953. 
5·flAs a Top Genera 1 ....Qees t·he. l'Yarl"l Now," U_· ,_S, News ~ 
~rlg Report, p. 14. 
6 .. t t gy _U,_S. News ~ World"Generals va. Vietnam ~ra e , 11 
B&port, LXIII (November, 1967), 114. 
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Still, limited bombing was more valuable than often 
1 
olaimed. It did raise the morale of South Vietnam, brought 
the war home to North Vietnam, diverted North Vietnamese 
manpower to reconstruotion work, reduced the flow of men and 
material into South Vietnam and interrupted communication. 
Consequently, it saved the lives of many Allied and Amerioan 
2
soldiers. Without it, perhaps as many as "eight hundred 
thousand additional United States troops" at a cost of 
seventy-five billion dollars over what was already spent 
would have been needed. 3 Suoh restraint demanded the high 
price of an extended war and the need for patience. 4 
The military did not promise a quick end to the 
conflict in Vietnam. Emphasized was the long struggle which 
Vietnam was to be. 5 As General Johnson stated "we should 
have no illusions about achieving success quickly in 
l H 1·d K.• J 0 hnson, If'k'nd.u . of VI.' etna·m War in Sight?",Lara.. ~.~. News ~ World Report, LXIII (September, 1967), 46. 
2Whee1er, "How to Fight the War in Vietnam," l[.§.. 
News & World Report, pp. )8-39· 
JlIlVlore of the Same, 'I Time, p. 37· 
4U•S., Congressional Record, CXV, No. 161, 11815· 
5"Vietnam-- rrop Marine's. Size-Up," [.§.. News! worlf 
also "As a Top GeneraBeport, LX (January, 1966) , 15 : see t 14, 
S' . . . h \.J 1'1 II U C' News & World Repor p. •I ees t e "ar ~ow, _'2·.- -tn··· R'. k " U.S. News & WorldWestmoreland, "Army Cutbacks--lhe 1S s, - - --­
Report, p. 71. 
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Viet Nam. ,,1 The belief that a long struggle could exact the 
sacrifice of money, luxuries and a casualty list became a 
reality.2 
The extension of participation in the conflict con­
cerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They did not aSSume the 
public would sillingly see the war through to a successful 
end. In 1965 General Wheeler claimed majority backing by 
the American public for United States involvement in 
Vietnam. 3 But from 1967 through 1969 the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff were far less positive of such support. 4 
Admiral Moorer indicated that from the onset of 
American involvement, North Vietnam focused on influencing 
American public opinion as a means of wearing away the will 
of the American people. 5 This is in line with that part of 
North Vietnam' s strategy which included to some lfmeasurable 
degree" the "false prospective rt that Americans did not have 
l"The \'lar: Winning Instead of Wishing," Time, 
LXXXVI (November, 1965), 31. 
2 "Vietnam--Top Marine' s Size-Up, II [.§.. ~ §: World 
Report, p. 15. 
3u •S., Congressional Record Appendix. eXI, 2494. 
4u•s., Qongressional Record Appendix, 90th ?ong., 1st 
SesSa (1967), eXIlI, 16671 see also U.S., Congresl?J.onal
Record, eXIlll, No. 24, 32031; U.s., Congressional Record, 
ClV, No. 167, 12536 • 
.5. D" f S?II _U.~_'. News ~ World"How Good Are U.S. e ense. , . 
Report, LXVII (December, 1969), 75· 
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the needed determination to see their defensive struggle to 
the f ' . h 1~nl.S • 
The need for the will on the part of the American 
people to stand firm at home as in Vietnam was voiced by 
General Chapman, 
I think we are now involved in a great test of 
national wills with Hanoi, and that the issue is 
hanging in the balance right now. Who's going to 
back down? Who's going to crack first? Do we have 
the determination to stick it out, to see our 
objectives accomplished after we have done so much? 
Our servicemen in Vietnam have the determination, 
but what of the people at home?2 
In attempting to rally pUblic support to the American 
commitment General Chapman used many time honored arguments 
concerning will power and deterrence: 
Americans grow weary of war, and not just this 
war, but the very idea of war--and the need to pre­
pare for war. But preparedness for war is synonymous 
with preparedness for defense. How many wars have 
not been fought because of this preparedness? And 
because Americans have been willing to fight on 
foreign shores how many times hav; we avoided 
fighting here, on our own ground? 
Americans had been willing to fight on foreign 
4
shores, in the past, but in this poorly understood war 
1Harold K. Johnson, "! Top General's View of U.S. 
Role in World," .Y..§.. News ~ World Report, LXIV (January, 
1968), 10. 
2U • S ., Congressional Record, C~IIII~ No. 24, ~20g1; 
see also U.S., Congressional Record, GXV, No. 167, 1 53 • 
3u.s ., Congressional Recorg, elV, No. 167, 12536. 
4u•s ., Congressional Recorq, CXIIII, No. 20, 26020. 
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the absence of a Pearl Harbor or a Lusitania failed to pro­
vide a "nationalistic fervor".l With the growing dissent in 
the United States over the war, especially its length2 the 
vi tal question was, would "the American people stick it 
out"?) 
General Wheeler felt that within South Vietnam a good 
deal of restraint was shown by American forces. The overall 
policy of weapons use ideally seen by the Joint Chiefs con­
sisted of attacks against military targets only. Civilian 
population were not to be deliberately attacked. In many 
bombing missions civilians were warned to take cover and to 
get away from the Viet Cong.4 There was no desire to kill 
innocent people. In many areas the control of weapons use 
was so tight as to require clearance by a provincial or 
district chief. 5 Yet, it was impossible to keep the civilians 
lWallace 1\1. Greene Jr., "Why We Will Win in Viet Nam, " 
Na tions Business (April, 1966), 116; see also U.S., Congres­
sional Record, eXIlIl, No. 20, 27059. 
2I1Vietnam--Top Marine's Size-Up," y..~. News ~ World 
Report, p. 15. 
Ju •s ., Congressional Record, eXIIII, No. 20, 27059. 
4Wheeler, "How to Fight the War in Vietnam, " 1!.~. 
News & World Report, pp. )9, 42. 
5 H t F{g.. ht the War in Vietnam," Q..§..Wheeler, "ow 0 ~. 
News & World RePort, pp. 42-4). 
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from being killed. Even American troops ran the risk of 
being killed by friendly fire power.1 
In line with the Joint Chief's policy of limited war, 
the United States refused to Use nuclear weapons to end the 
war quickly. By doing so the United States prevented the 
possible expansion of this conventional war into a nuclear 
conflict. 
As early as 1962, nuclear weapons were declared in­
appropriate for Vietnam and southeast Asia in dealing with 
conventional force aggression. The use of conventional 
2weapons were considered suitable in that area. Barring of 
nuclear weapons did not eliminate their role in American 
policy since "strategic persuasion" was carried out under 
the protection of the "nuclear umbrella".J Strategic 
capability prevented the war from escalating into a nuclear 
" 4conflict while allowing the United States freedom of ac t ~on. 
As deep as the conventional commitment was in Vietnam, 
the need to retain strategic nuclear forces was evident. As 
1 " ~e t nam W _TTu .• §."."Air Power--What it is Doing l.n V· ar, II 
~ews ~ Worl~ Repo~t, p. 29· 
2George H. Decker, "The Nature of the Army Missions 
Place in National Defense, II Vi tal Speeches of the Day, 
XXVIII (September, 1962), 726. 
3McConnell, "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Nams 
Strategic Persuasion," p. 1J. 
4McConnell, "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Name 
Strategic Persuasion," p. 12. 
• 
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in Vietnam, United States strategic superiority in the future 
should prevent conflicts from reaching the level of nuclear 
1 
war. 
Weapons technology gave the United States a capacity 
to destroy North Vietnam without the use of nuclear weapons; 
it would take just a little longer with conventional ones. 2 
The use of advanced technology in other areas resulted in 
the capacity to keep the mortality rate down to two percent 
of those wounded,) the ability to monitor automatically any 
movement around a given position, 4 and the prevention of 
ambushes by using defoliation chemicals to destroy ground 
5cover. The helicopter provided mobility for quick reaction 
to enemy infiltration. 6 This was in keeping with the Joint 
Chiefs' policy of using the most advanced technology possible 
in any given conflict. 
lU.S., Congressional Record Appendix, eXII, 2163· 
2Wheeler, IIHow to Fight the War in Vietnam, II !l..§.. 
News :i \!Jorld Report, p. 39· 
311General Greene Tells the Story of Vietnam War, 11 
1!.§.. News :i World geport, p. 39. 
4"V· t T ft~.arl·ne. 's Size-Up, Ii U_.•§.. News ~ World1 e nam-- op 1V. 
Report, p. 15. 
5McConnell, "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Nam: 
Strategic Persuasion, II p. 13. 
6 11 th Story. of Vietnam War,"
"General Greene Te se . 
g.§.. News ~ World Report, p. 35· 
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General Wheeler contended that the massive effort in 
Vietnam did not radically affect American ability to respond 
to other emergencies in the world from the Middle East to 
• A . 1LatJ.n merJ.ca. Although readily admitting United States' 
forces were spread a bit thinner than before Vietnam, 
General Greene displayed the confidence that America retained 
a strong deterrence capability.2 Strategically speaking the 
Vietnam war did not reduce American capacity to respond to 
hostile strategic acts.) Yet General Westmoreland was not as 
confident. In September 1969, he called American military 
assets marginal in backing up her commitments. 4 
Vietnam illustrated the need for the capability to 
deal with military conflicts in all types of environments, 
from the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam to the sophis­
ticated environment of Europe. 5 It SUbstantiated the need 
for substantial deployment of forward forces, and preparation 
lWheeler, IlHow to Fight the War in Vietnam," 1!..§.. 
News & World Report, p. 44. 
2UHow Good Are U"S. Defenses?", Q.§.. News ~ World 
R~port, p. 74. 
Ju•s ., Congressional ft.ecord Appendix, eXI J 2495· 
4 Cutbacks--The Risks," :[.§..Westmoreland, "Army 
News §f World Report, p. 67· 
5Earle G. ~"lheeler, "The Design of Military Power: 
r' p, Vital Speeches of theOnly One Component of NatJ.onal ower, It .. . 
Day, XXIX (December, 1962), pp. 157-158. 
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for limited as well as non-limited war. 1 
The official military posJ.'t~on as 
.L seen by General 
Westmoreland is that Vietnam has been a limited war with 
t' 2 ,d b ' limite 0 Jec 1ves, pr1marily those of preventing North 
Vietnam from conquering South Vietnam without destroying 
the aggressor,3 The force used has best fit the national 
interest. Limitations on military actions have been based 
on humanitarian and political considerations. American 
national leaders have desired to achieve their goals through 
the minimum use of force necessary to get the job done. 4 
In 1938 England and France sacrificed the Sudeten 
provinces of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in a futile 
attempt to gain peace in their time. Similar appeasement 
to Communist ambitions in South Vietnam by the withdrawal 
of American support was ruled out. Churchill's warning 
that "the belief that security can be gained by throwing a 
small state to the wolves is a fatal decision,,5 did not go 
unheeded. 
l V •S.. Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966 ). ex. I I, No.1. 541. 
2t1estmoreland, "Army Cutbacks--The Risks," !I.§.. News 
& World Report. p. 71. 
3u•s., Congressional Record. ClV, No. 167,12536; see 
also U.S., Congressional Record, exv, No. 161, 11815· 
4u•s., Congressional f{ecord Appendix. eXII, 2162-2163· 
5 . t Comparisons and Convictions, \I pp.Johnson, "Vle naml 
169-170. 
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Military aspects dominated the war. The sociological, 
economical and psychological aspects involved were often over­
looked. The Vietnam conflict is fundamentally a political 
happening,1 that was more likely to fade away than come to a 
2
sudden end. All the Communists had to do was put an end to 
their aggression.) 
Lacking a final formula for success4 and asserting 
that this war would not be taken over by the United States,S 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured the nation that military 
victory was still possible in Vietnam. 6 In any event there 
will be a victor and a loser. North Vietnam will succeed 
or fail in achieving her goals. 7 
lWestmoreland, "Talking About the Army: Promote the 
Common Defense, \I p. 452; see also "General Greene Tells the 
Story of Vietnam War, II 1[.[. News ~ World Report, p. 40. 
2\1How Good Are U.S. Defenses?", Q.§.. News & World 
Report, p. 75 z see also Westmoreland, "Army Cutbacks--The 
Risks, II Q.. §.. News ! World Report, p. 71. 
3"E.'nd the War Talks? What General Wheeler Thinks,"
y.§. News ~ World Report, p. 10. 
4u.S " Congressional Record Appendix, eXII, 442. 
5U •s ., Congressional ~ecord Appendix, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1966}, GXII, 50~. 
6"The u.s. Army of the '70's As Westmoreland Portrays 
It," U.S. News ~ World l1eport, LXVII (December, 1969), 1). 
7Wheeler, "Vietnaml A Military Appraisal," p. 61). 
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that the 
military aspects of this conflict could be solved.1 They 
did not, however, call for an absolute military resolution 
of the problem. 
• U n U_··.• _5. News ~ World1 T ~"arl'nels S1ze- PI
"Vietnam-- op jV. 
Report, p. 15· 
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Chapter 6 
DETERRENCE IN THE 1960's: LIMITATIONS, FAILURE AND SUCCESS 
For a quarter of a century the containment of 
Communist expansion and the desire to avoid nuclear war 
between the super powers have been the most conspicuous 
limiting aspects of United States military responses to 
Communist aggression. 
Two additional factors dating from the Korean war 
which have also moderated American counteraction options to 
Communist incursions, have been the willingness of the United 
states to fight limited wars for limited goals and the 
inclination of American political leadership to fight such 
conflicts as it saw fit regardless of domestic political, 
social and economic repercussions. 
These four dominant elements coverged in the 
American commitment in Vietnam. The lack of any one of them 
would have made the intensive military involvement by the 
United States in Vietnam highly improbable. 
Yet members of the Joint ChiefS of Staff in the 
1960's through their public statements concerning nuclear 
deterrence, non-nuclear deterrence and Vietnam, directly 
reinforced what have been traditional limitations on the 
American military. 
The major concern of the Joint Chiefs involved the 
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maintenance of a policy that would guarantee American 
national security. In line with that policy the standard 
ploy of containing Communist expansion to safeguard the 
nation's security found prominence in their statements 
backing United States' commitment in South Vietnam. However, 
such an argument failed to convince the American public of 
the need for such an extensive military counteraction. 
Any gain achieved by the temporary halting of Co~­
munist ambitions in South Vietnam can in no way match the 
benefits that would have occurred had the tremendous economic 
effort used in Vietnam been allocated to the economic, poli­
tical and military development of more important nations in 
Southeast Asia such as Indonesia and Japan. 
By publicly supporting a limited war for limited 
goals, primarily that of achieving a status guo ante bellum 
position, members of the Joint Chiefs have confirmed and 
continued that policy. In essence American reaction in 
Korea and in Vietnam invited the aggressor nation to achieve 
the traditional military goals of conquering and then 
absorbing its intended victim, with a de facto guarantee 
that its own national sovereignty would not be challenged 
by the United States. The line of action taken by the Joint 
Chiefs towards the initiator of hostilities caused the 
aggressor at the very worst severe economic and population 
losses. 
Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their civilian 
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superiors sought to avoid a nuclear armageddon. Such a 
pragmatic policy came from the eXigency of avoiding the use 
of the continental United States as a battlefield in any 
type of world war. This policy caused the United States 
to limit its military action in Vietnam. It also raised the 
question of why Communist powers could act in such a bel­
ligerent fashion with what seemed to be far less dread of 
precipitating a nuclear war, and not the United States? In 
essence the answer is the status quo outlook which has 
guided United States' military reactions from the mid-1940's 
to the 1970·s. 
Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree 
entirely on the way the war in Vietnam was being fought, 
they did for the most part accept the need to support their 
superiors' policy. Individual Chiefs in effect acted as 
mouthpieces of administration military policy for Vietnam. 
The unpopularity of the Vietnam war in the latter 
part of the 1960's had the Joint Chiefs members placing 
their superiors' policy before the American public in quest 
of its support. Such support did not materialize especially 
in the last three years of that decade. The expressed 
limitations placed on the war did not satisfy the Hawks, 
while the Doves were dissatisfied by what they considered 
over-involvement by the United States. 
The belief that limited non-nuclear war would more 
likely come about than nuclear war in the 1960's proved 
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accurate • Such vindication of the Joint Dh' f' ' ~e s v~ews was 
no doubt of small condolence to the Amer1 can f '1' 
... aml. l.es that 
have suffered in any number of ways because of the Vietnam 
conflict. 
In part the Joint Chiefs' of Staff concepts on 
nuclear war and non-nuclear war deterrence policy also helped 
pave the way for the American military effort in South 
Vietnam. The United States nuclear arms capability based 
on the need for strategic nuclear superiority played a major 
role in the size of the American effort in Vietnam. United 
States forces would not have entered Vietnam in such large 
numbers wi thou t the protection of the "nuclear umbrella". 
This strategic nuclear power also kept the war limited. 
In the 1960's the Joint Chiefs also acknowledged the 
need to adopt a policy of flexible response in thought and 
in deed. The very acceptance of limited war and prepara­
tion to fight non-nuclear conflicts made American involve­
ment in Vietnam much more likely than it would have otherwise 
been. Without such a consensus by the executive office and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, American involvement in Vietnam would 
have been nil , and the impact of that war would have been ~ 
far less on the American political and social scene. 
The policy of deterrence by limited war advanced by 
the Joint Chiefs did not achieve all of its goals. However r 
although the initial objective of preventing limited war, 
especially that of the level reached in Vietnam failed, the 
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flexible response ability of the United States had prevented 
successful Communist aggression in South Vietnam up to 
August 1972. 
Conveniently overlooked by the critics of American 
participation in Vietnam has been the far more important, 
although less spectacular success of the Joint Chiefs' policy 
which prevented nuclear war in the 1960·s. The loss of 
American lives and waste of American economic energy in the 
Vietnam war can by no means compare with the slaughter of 
human lives and the insurmountable physical damage that would 
have occurred in the United States had a nuclear war been 
unleashed. 
If the military is to be condemned for fighting a war 
in Vietnam under limitations imposed by civilian superiors 
and accepted by the Joint Chiefs it should be given recogni­
tion for the successfUl policy of avoiding nuclear war. 
For the remainder of the 20th century, United states' 
deterrence policy will continue to be limited by the American 
desire to prevent nuclear war, to stop Communist expansion 
and to fight limited wars for liml ted goals. Also t despite 
the growing difficulty to do so, American leadership will 
continue to fight conventional wars as it sees fit. 
Less uncertain will be the degree of cooperation and 
support by individual Chiefs in advocating unpopular, 
unwanted or unneeded direction of military policy from 
civilian bosses. 
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